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In the United States, employers who have little formal accountability largely manage health
and retirement benefits of the working class. Employers face an enormous amount of responsibil-
ity to properly manage and protect the health and retirement benefits of their employees and their
families. These organizational entities, however, are not subject to similar institutional safeguards
as major public pension funds. Thus, Congress enacted the Employment Retirement Income Secu-
rities Act to charge employers with fiduciary duties of care over such plans. However, the remedies
for those who breach their duty by mishandling funds or arbitrarily dispensing and denying bene-
fits are quite limited. The federal statute that governs preempts all state remedies and all common
law tort actions for bad faith. Thus, disappointed policyholders and beneficiaries are limited only
to the remedy of ERISA Section 502. ERISA Section 502 establishes an exclusive civil cause of
action, but the federal court’s remedy is also quite narrow. Congress’s inclusion of Section 510’s
whistleblowing, anti-retaliation provision acts as an additional safeguard to counter employers’
significant lack of transparency and accountability by encouraging employees and pension bene-
ficiaries to bring to light any allegations of fiduciary breach. Given the limited public oversight of
ERISA plans, a more expansive interpretation of ERISA Section 510’s whistleblowing provision
is particularly important in order to allow it to be an effective, safeguarding mechanism. Despite
this, the federal circuits have split in Section 510’s application to internal, unsolicited complaints.
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ABSTRACT 
In the United States, employers who have little formal accountability 
largely manage health and retirement benefits of the working 
class.  Employers face an enormous amount of responsibility to 
properly manage and protect the health and retirement benefits of 
their employees and their families.  These organizational entities, 
however, are not subject to similar institutional safeguards as major 
public pension funds.  Thus, Congress enacted the Employment 
Retirement Income Securities Act to charge employers with 
fiduciary duties of care over such plans. 
However, the remedies for those who breach their duty by 
mishandling funds or arbitrarily dispensing and denying benefits are 
quite limited.  The federal statute that governs preempts all state 
remedies and all common law tort actions for bad faith.  Thus, 
disappointed policyholders and beneficiaries are limited only to the 
remedy of ERISA Section 502.  ERISA  Section 502 establishes an 
exclusive civil cause of action, but the federal court’s remedy is also 
quite narrow.  Congress’s inclusion of Section 510’s whistleblowing, 
anti-retaliation provision acts as an additional safeguard to counter 
employers’ significant lack of transparency and accountability by 
encouraging employees and pension beneficiaries to bring to light 
any allegations of fiduciary breach. 
Given the limited public oversight of ERISA plans, a more 
expansive interpretation of ERISA Section 510’s whistleblowing 
provision is particularly important in order to allow it to be an 
effective, safeguarding mechanism.  Despite this, the federal circuits 
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have split in Section 510’s application to internal, unsolicited 
complaints. 
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There is an unresolved split among seven federal circuit courts on 
whether employees are protected from employer retaliation for 
internally reporting unsolicited Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act1 complaints.2 The cases each circuit has considered have 
been factually similar—an ERISA benefit plan participant, beneficiary 
and/or employee administrator was allegedly discharged after 
complaining about or objecting to an alleged ERISA violation.3 The 
alleged violations have all involved breaches of fiduciary duty—
assertions of impropriety in handling plans as opposed to a breach of a 
																																																																																																																																
 1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. ch. 18 (2012) 
[hereinafter ERISA]. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332, 333-35 (6th Cir. 2014); George 
v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812, 813-14 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010); Nicolaou v. 
Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 327 (2d Cir. 2005); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 
F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003); Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1312, 1312-
13 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 409-10 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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plan itself.4 Benefit plan participants and/or beneficiaries have no claim 
for compensatory or punitive damages, so the legal mechanisms for 
holding plan administrators accountable to their legal obligations are 
very limited and narrowed by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
law.5 Therefore, whistleblower allegations are a particularly important 
safeguard in protecting such plans from abuse.6 
The Fifth, Seventh and Ninth circuits have found that ERISA 
Section 5107 protects an employee’s unsolicited internal complaints of 
ERISA violations.8  However, the Second, Third, and Fourth circuits 
have expressly rejected this position and denied any whistleblower 
protection to unsolicited internal ERISA complaints under Section 510.9 
Most recently, the split has gained further traction as the Sixth Circuit 
Courts of Appeals affirmed constraints of Section 510’s whistleblowing 
provision by also rejecting whistleblower protection for unsolicited 
internal complaints.10 
This Note aims to analyze the persisting unresolved circuit split 
regarding the boundaries of Section 510’s whistleblowing protection.11 
Part I of the Note provides background on ERISA’s enactment, key 
provisions of ERISA accountability safeguards and Section 510’s role to 
protect and promote disclosure. Part II discusses each circuit’s position 
regarding whether Section 510 protects unsolicited internal complaints 
as well as the interpretive methods employed to reach said 
determination. Part III explores external persuasive factors including the 
Department of Labor’s position, the inadequacy of uniformed state law 
remedies and the growing trend of protecting whistleblower disclosure. 
All of these persuasive factors advocate for Section 510 to protect all 
																																																																																																																																
 4. Sexton, 754 F.3d at 334-35; George, 694 F.3d at 813-14; A.H. Cornell, 610 
F.3d at 219; Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 327; King, 337 F.3d at 422-23; Anderson, 11 F.3d at 
1312; Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 409-10. 
 5. See Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, Welfare Benefits and Bad Faith: Losing 
Sight of the Cathedral, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 387, 395 (2004). 
 6. See infra Part I.C. 
 7. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012). This Note will refer to ERISA provisions by the 
section number of ERISA instead of the section number in the United States Code. 
 8. 29 U.S.C. § 1140; George, 694 F.3d at 817; Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315; 
Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411. 
 9. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223; Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329; King, 337 F.3d         
at 427. 
 10. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 11. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
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forms of whistleblowing, including unsolicited internal complaints. Part 
IV endorses a broad interpretation of Section 510, mandated either 
judicially or legislatively, that would keep employers accountable to 
their fiduciary duties by providing all ERISA whistleblowers the highest 
and broadest level of protection. 
I. BACKGROUND OF ERISA AND ITS FRAMEWORK 
In order to determine the most appropriate way to interpret Section 
510 to increase employer accountability, it is necessary to first 
understand the basic framework of ERISA. 12  Part I focuses on the 
overall intent, purpose and goals of ERISA’s enactment.13 Specifically, 
this part examines the development of three ERISA concepts that 
substantially affect employer accountability: fiduciary duty; 14  civil 
enforcement;15 and preemption.16 Finally, this part details Section 510’s 
whistleblowing and anti-retaliation aspects.17 
A. UNDERSTANDING ERISA 
In 1974, Congress recognized that the employee benefit plan sector 
substantially increased in all aspects (size, scope, and value), but its 
regulation remained minimal and ineffective. 18  Such benefit plans 
include “any plan, fund or program . . . established or maintained by an 
employer” that provides “medical, surgical or hospital care or benefits, 
or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or 
unemployment.” 19  Thus, in 1974 Congress enacted the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act to “promote the interests of employees 
and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans” and “ensure that plans 
																																																																																																																																
 12. 29 U.S.C. § 1001. 
 13. Id. 
 14. 29 U.S.C. § 1113. 
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
 16. 29 U.S.C. § 1144. 
 17. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 18. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4839-40. 
 19. 29 U.S.C. § 1002. 
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and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law.”20 
Thus, ERISA enactment aimed to standardize the governance of private 
pension and health care plans across the nation.21 
ERISA covers pension benefit plans.22 An employee pension plan 
includes a program or fund, which either “provides retirement income to 
employees” or establishes “a deferral of income by employees for 
periods extending to the termination of covered employment or 
beyond.”23 ERISA sets minimum standards for most voluntary benefit 
health plans to protect employees who elect to participate in such 
plans.24 As a comprehensive federal law, ERISA includes information 
regarding funding, participation standards and more importantly, the 
fiduciary duties of those responsible for managing such plans.25 
Congress enacted ERISA due to the increasing national public 
interest in employee benefit plans.26 That interest continues to flourish 
as the benefit plan sector exhibits tremendous growth—as of October 
29, 2013, such welfare plans covered about 141 million American 
workers, retirees and their families. 27  The ERISA plans also have 
substantial authority and impact upon other non-retirement benefits such 
as disability insurance, life insurance, severance pay and the provision 
of health care.28 Employee benefit plans also have a considerable effect 
																																																																																																																																
 20. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137, 142 (1990) (citing Shaw 
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)). 
 21. See Health Plans & Benefits, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/erisa.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 1002; Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm. Defined benefit plans 
allocate a specified monthly benefit amount at retirement, whereas defined contribution 
plans do not. Id. In defined contribution plans, employers or employees, or both, 
annually contribute a specified rate to the employees’ individual account under the plan. 
Id. (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(a)(1)-(2). 
 24. Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings – ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/erisa.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 25. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year Agency Results, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsFYagencyresults.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
 28. ERISA-governed welfare plans provide the majority of private health insurance 
in the United States. For example, as of 2006, 62% (162.7 million) of non-elderly 
Americans received health insurance from an employer. See Sara R. Collins, Chapin 
White & Jennifer L. Kriss, Whither Employer-Based Health Insurance?, THE 
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on interstate commerce, development of industries, growth of 
employment opportunities and protection of employees.29 As of October 
29, 2013, these plans included assets of over $7.6 trillion.30 Because 
such plans receive preferential federal tax treatment, they also have a 
direct effect on United States revenues.31 
Most importantly, however, the government drafted ERISA to 
protect employee pensions.32 ERISA is fundamental in protecting the 
retirement security of Americans. 33  ERISA is an inclusive statute 
designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in 
employee benefit plans.34 
The Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) is 
responsible for enforcing ERISA and ensuring the integrity of the 
private employee benefit plan system. 35  With such immense growth 
comes the need to enforce employer administrator accountability. 36 
EBSA oversees almost 684,000 retirement plans and approximately 2.4 
million health plans.37 In the 2013 fiscal year alone, a total of $1.69 
billion dollars was collected from enforcement, voluntary fiduciary 
																																																																																																																																
COMMONWEALTH FUND, 7 fig.1 (Sept. 2007), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/ 
media/files/publications/issue-brief/2007/sep/whither-employer-based-health-
insurance—the-current-and-future-role-of-u-s—companies-in-the-
provis/collins_whitheremployer-basedhltins_1059-pdf.pdf. This is important, as 
Americans with private insurance make the most healthcare expenditures (79% in 
2004). See, e.g., Gary Olin, Medical Expenditures of the Non-Elderly, MEDICAL 
EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY (Jan. 2008), http://meps.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/ 
st197/stat197.pdf (discussing the impact of ERISA on medical expenditures). 
 29. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). 
 30. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 27. 
 31. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). 
 32. As stated by a Symposium participant, “ERISA was Congress’ attempt to 
devise a comprehensive regulatory program to protect millions of American workers 
who looked to private pension plans for financial support in their retirement years,” 
JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, A 
POLITICAL HISTORY 51 (2004). 
 33. ERISA-administered “retirement plans are the single largest source of income 
[aside from Social Security] for aged Americans. Id. at 1-2. 
 34. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 103 (1983). 
 35. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 27. 
 36. See Frequently Asked Questions, ERISA FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATORS, 
http://www.erisafiduciaryadministrators.com/index.php/faqs-2/ (last visited Jan. 12, 
2014); U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 27. 
 37. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 27. 
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corrects, and informal complaint resolutions.38 Additionally, in the 2013 
fiscal year, EBSA investigations led to the indictment of 88 persons for 
employment benefit plans crimes.39 
B. ERISA ACCOUNTABILITY SAFEGUARDS: FIDUCIARY DUTY, CIVIL 
ENFORCEMENT & PREEMPTION 
It is evident that employer accountability was an underlying 
principle in the enactment of ERISA when specifically examining the 
Act’s fiduciary duty,40 civil enforcement,41 and preemption safeguards.42 
This section will first focus on each congressional safeguard 
individually and discuss their associated developmental trajectories. 
Then, the section will collectively consider the direct impact of such 
developments in the context of employer accountability. 
1. Fiduciary Duty 
ERISA requires employers to follow certain fiduciary conduct 
standards.43 These duties are particularly significant with respect to the 
level of protection granted by the Act. 44  In notable cases, the 
whistleblowing assertions were from alleged impropriety in fiduciaries’ 
handling of plans, rather than breaches of the plans themselves.45 
Under ERISA, persons who exercise discretionary control or 
authority over a benefit plan (via management, administration or assets) 
are automatically fiduciaries.46 ERISA requires benefit plans to contain 
																																																																																																																																
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 1113. 
 41. Id. § 1132. 
 42. Id. § 1144. 
 43. Id. § 1104. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014); George v. 
Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2012); Edwards v. A.H. 
Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, 
Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th 
Cir. 2003); Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1312 (5th Cir. 1994); 
Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 46. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993); see also ERISA 
FIDUCIARY LAW 12-13 (Susan P. Serota & Frederick A. Brodie eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
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“one or more named fiduciaries who . . . shall have authority to control 
and manage the operation and administration of the plan.”47 The named 
fiduciary is either named in the documentation of the plan or is 
identified by the employing entity. 48  This fiduciary also has the 
functional responsibility of exercising “discretionary control or 
authority” of the “plan’s management, administration or assets.”49 
Fiduciaries must uphold duties pursuant to ERISA Section 404(a).50 
They may not circumvent or find exemption from these statutorily 
required responsibilities in any employee benefit plan.51 Fiduciary action 
is set to a specific code of conduct.52 This principally requires fiduciaries 
to act “solely in the interest of the [plan’s] participants and 
beneficiaries.”53 Section 404 requires fiduciaries to provide plan benefits 
to participants and beneficiaries as well as to defray reasonable expenses 
in administering the plan.54 They must execute their fiduciary actions 
with great “care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances” 
as a “prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such 
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and 
with like aims.”55 The fiduciary also has the responsibility of curtailing 
risk of losses by diversifying plan investments, unless it is prudent to not 
do so.56 Additionally, the fiduciary must act in accordance with “the 
documents and instruments governing the plan,” so long as they comply 
with ERISA provisions.57 Ultimately, the proper exercise of fiduciary 
duty is adjudicated against how someone with expertise in the area 
would act—a fiduciary is not exempt from Section 404(a)’s duties 
simply due to their own lack of expertise in an area.58 Under Section 
																																																																																																																																
 47. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). 
 48. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2). 
 49. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262 (1993); see also U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); ERISA 
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 13. 
 50. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A); ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 13. 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a); see PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 14, 121 (2010). 
 52. 29 U.S.C. §1104. 
 53. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
 54. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A). 
 55. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
 56. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C). 
 57. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D). 
 58. See, e.g., Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that attaining independent appraisals does not satisfy fiduciary duty); Fink v. Nat’l Sav. 
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409, fiduciaries that fail to adhere to their fiduciary responsibilities may 
be held personally liable for losses resulting from said failure.59 
When it pertains to multiple plan fiduciaries, under Section 405, a 
fiduciary may be liable for another fiduciary’s breach of duty.60 Liability 
may also be established if the fiduciary “participates knowingly in, or 
knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or omission of such other 
fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach.”61 Thus, fiduciaries 
with actual knowledge have a duty to discontinue providing assistance 
to violating co-fiduciaries and to divulge said violations.62 Failure to 
take reasonable steps to remedy violations when a fiduciary has 
knowledge of said violation may also result in liability.63 Although at 
least one court held constructive knowledge to be sufficient, courts vary 
in the amount of knowledge required to prompt the obligation to 
reasonably remedy the violation.64 Lastly, fiduciaries may also be liable 
if failure to fulfill their personal fiduciary duty facilitates a co-
fiduciary’s breach.65 In this instance, a co-fiduciary does not need to 
possess actual knowledge to be found liable.66 Instead, the ability for a 
co-fiduciary to commit a violation because the fiduciary did not 
																																																																																																																																
& Trust Co., 722 F.2d 951, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“A fiduciary’s independent 
investigation of the merits of a particular investment is at the heart of the prudent 
person standard.”); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1474 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that obtainment of expert advice is allowed to fulfill the prudent person 
standard of Section 404(a)); ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 237-38. 
 59. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 12, 31. 
 60. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a). 
 61. Id. § 1105(a)(1). 
 62. See id.; ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 377. 
 63. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(3). 
 64. See, e.g., Silverman v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 
1998) (holding that fiduciaries can be held liable on if they have actual knowledge of 
co-fiduciary breach); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding a 
fiduciary must possess actual knowledge that the co-fiduciary breached); In re Dyngy, 
Inc. ERISA Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 905-06 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding constructive 
knowledge as sufficient); see also ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 377-78. 
 65. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) (stating that a fiduciary is liable for another fiduciary’s 
breach if the failure to comply with Section 404(a) “enabled such other fiduciary to 
commit a breach”). 
 66. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 581 
(S.D. Tex. 2003); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 378. 
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appropriately comply with Section 404(a) is enough to find the fiduciary 
liable.67 
2. Civil Enforcement of ERISA 
Section 510 and the ERISA civil remedies work in conjunction to 
increase employer accountability. 68  Whereas Section 510 protects 
whistleblowers that disclose fiduciary breach from adverse retaliation,69 
Section 502(a) allows individuals to rectify and redress fiduciary 
breaches via civil litigation.70 
Congress’s chief purpose for enacting Section 502(a) is to provide 
those injured by a statutory violation access to a suitable remedy.71 In 
addition to mandating administrative review, ERISA also authorizes 
civil litigation to rectify violations.72 Section 502’s “civil enforcement 
scheme . . . is one of the essential tools for accomplishing the stated 
purposes of ERISA.”73 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, Section 
502(a) sets forth exclusive remedies available in ERISA civil 
litigation.74 Specifically, subsection (1) to (3) contours the circumstances 
																																																																																																																																
 67. In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 580 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2)); 
see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 378. 
 68. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
 69. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 70. See 29 U.S.C. §1132. 
 71. Congress specifically expressed this expectation in describing ERISA as 
“providing for appropriate remedies.” Id. § 1001 (emphasis added). Additionally, the 
statute’s civil enforcement provisions also implements several usages of the term 
“appropriate.” Id. § 1001; id. § 1109(a) (“equitable or remedial relief as the court may 
deem appropriate”); id. § 1132(a)(2) (“appropriate relief”); id. § 1132(a)(3) 
(“appropriate equitable relief”). See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
 72. See id. § 1132(a) (entitled “Civil Enforcement”); see also id. § 1001 (entitled 
“Congressional findings and declaration of policy” and providing that “[i]t is hereby 
declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect . . . the interest of participants in 
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . by providing for . . . ready access to 
the Federal courts.”). 
 73. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987). 
 74. Id. at 54 (“The deliberate care with which ERISA’s civil enforcement remedies 
were drafted . . . argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA’s civil enforcement 
remedies were intended to be exclusive.”); Mass. Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 
U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (“The . . . carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found 
in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted, however, provide strong evidence that 
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of three separate civil actions by which a participant, beneficiary or 
fiduciary may enforce ERISA.75 
First, under Section 502(a)(1)(B), a participant or beneficiary can 
bring an action for direct enforcement of the plan’s benefits, such as the 
rights of plan or future benefits of the plan.76 Participants are likely to 
use this option if they believe they have been wrongfully denied plan 
benefits.77 Oddly, plaintiffs may file a lawsuit to recover benefits under 
this subsection, unlike other civil litigation authorized by ERISA, in 
either federal or state court.78 However, only a small fraction of benefit 
denials actually results in litigation in either federal or state court.79 
Second, under Section 502(a)(2), a participant, beneficiary, 
fiduciary or the Secretary of Labor may bring an action against a 
fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duties as defined in ERISA Section 
409.80 If pertaining to a defined contribution plan, when the fiduciary’s 
breach damages the assets of an individual account, individual recovery 
is permissible. 81  However, if pertaining to a defined benefit plan, 
Section 502(a)(2) limits the relief sought on behalf of the plan, and not 
the individual.82 
																																																																																																																																
Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate 
expressly”) (emphasis added). 
 75. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1-3). 
 76. Id. §1132(a)(1)(B); see also JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA 
LITIGATION 107 (3d ed. 2008). 
 77. ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 76, at 107; John H. Langbein, What ERISA 
Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and 
Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1334 (2003); see also Regina L. Readling, 
Comment, Rethinking “The Plan”: Why ERISA Section 502(a)(2) Should Allow 
Recovery to Individual Defined Contribution Pension Plan Accounts, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 
315, 329 (2008). 
 78. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (“Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of 
this section, the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive           
jurisdiction . . . ”). 
 79. See, e.g., Susan M. Mangiero, ERISA Fiduciaries Beware: Risk Is More Than a 
Four-Letter Word, 19 PROB. & PROP. 65, 65 (2005) (explaining that according to the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, there were 9,167 new ERISA cases in 2000 
and 11,499 in 2004). 
 80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); see supra Part I.B.1. 
 81. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). 
 82. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985); Susan 
Harthill, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-
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Third, Section 502(a)(3) permits participants, beneficiaries or 
fiduciaries, inter alia, to bring action to “obtain other appropriate 
equitable relief” to redress violations or enforce provision of the 
subchapter or the ERISA plan’s terms.83 Although this option is often 
categorized as a “catch-all provision,” 84  the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation has limited an individual’s ability to successfully litigate 
mishandled ERISA plans.85 The Supreme Court continues to develop the 
precise meaning of “equitable relief” in Section 502(a)(3), but has 
rejected recovery of extra-contractual or punitive damages by injured 
litigants.86 
Thus, the Supreme Court has barred any ERISA recovery of 
monetary compensation for consequential injuries caused by the 
improper handling of benefit plans. This rejection is far-reaching 
because it bars any such recovery under state law as well due to ERISA 
preemption. 
3. ERISA Preemption 
Preemption of state law is key to how the Federal Circuits came to 
interpret Section 510.87 The seminal case of each Circuit’s Section 510 
interpretation relied upon the finding of ERISA preemption in order to 
justify the action’s removal to federal jurisdiction and subsequent denial 
																																																																																																																																
Whole” Relief is Available Under ERSA Section 502(a)(3), 61 OKLA. L. REV. 721, 738 
(2008). 
 83. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). 
 84. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996); ZANGLEIN & STABILE, 
supra note 76, at 110. 
 85. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257 (1993) (rejecting the 
government’s argument that participants and beneficiaries were entitled to seek 
compensatory damages under Section 502(a)(3)’s “equitable relief” because, “at 
common law, the courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over virtually all actions by 
beneficiaries for breach of trust”). 
 86. See, e.g., Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 356 (2006) 
(recognizing the remedy of equitable lien by contractual agreement as “typically 
available in equity”). However, the Court continues to deny the categorization of any 
remedy as equitable to allow recovery of monetary compensation for consequential 
injuries of ERISA violations. 
 87. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144. 
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of Plaintiff’s motion to remand to state court.88 Preemption is also the 
sole reason state law causes of actions lose all traction if the court 
determines an existing ERISA connection.89 
Under Section 514,90  ERISA expressly preempts state laws and 
deems that it “shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may 
now or hereafter relate to any” benefit plan covered by ERISA. 91 
Therefore, ERISA preempts the state law or claim if a state law relates 
to something within ERISA’s scope, albeit indirectly. 92  ERISA 
supersedes any state laws related to employment benefit plans covered 
by ERISA largely due to the standardized, interstate nature of employee 
benefit plans.93 With the intention that ERISA be “exclusively a federal 
concern,” 94  Congress included this preemption to create a uniform 
structure removed from “conflicting or inconsistent state laws.” 95 
However, contrary to Section 514’s intention, some courts have had 
																																																																																																																																
 88. See infra Part II. Circuit Split depicts the reoccurring trend of Defendants 
removing the case to federal court claiming ERISA preemption after the Plaintiffs file 
retaliation cause of action under state law in state courts. Subsequently, Plaintiffs lose 
the ability to seek redress under state laws due to ERISA preemption and are therefore 
are limited to civil remedies. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 89. See generally William Pierron & Paul Fronstin, ERISA Pre-emption: 
Implications for Health Reform and Coverage, ISSUE BRIEF (Emp. Benefit Research 
Inst., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_02a-20082.pdf (discussing the effects of ERISA pre-emption 
on national health coverage). 
 90. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144. 
 91. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). “‘State law’ includes all laws, decision, rules, regulations, 
or other State action having the effect of law . . . .” See also Richard A. Epstein & Alan 
O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, ERISA Preemption, and 
Class Actions, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625, 631 (2001) (“All courts seem to agree that 
disputes over the coverage of an employee benefit plan relate to the administration of 
the plan and thus come within ERISA’s general preemption clause.”). 
 92. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990). 
 93. 29 U.S.C. § 1144; S.29 U.S.C. § 1144; S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 29 (1973), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865. 
 94. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981). 
 95. See 120 CONG. REC. 29, 933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Harrison A.      
Williams, Jr.). 
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difficulty determining if ERISA preempts state law, and thus, have 
inevitably created a structure that conflicts from circuit to circuit.96 
Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the ERISA preemption 
clause broadly to hold that a state law “relates to” ERISA if it is in 
“connection with” or with “reference to” a plan covered by ERISA.97 
Furthermore, plaintiff’s state law claims, which rely on the existence of 
or participation in ERISA plans, are also preempted.98 Therefore, a state 
law cause of action that “duplicates, supplements, or supplants” 
remedies under Section 502(a) is preempted by ERISA because it is 
considered a federal claim.99 
Although the Supreme Court recently constricted ERISA’s 
preemption scope, it is limited to a very specific fact situation.100 In New 
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Insurance Co., the Supreme Court held that ERISA did not preempt 
vicarious liability malpractice claims brought against managed care 
organizations. 101  The Court adopted this position based on the 
“assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”102 The Court reasoned that the state laws at issue 
would still allow, rather than impede, the uniformed regulation of 
employee benefit plans across the states.103 
																																																																																																																																
 96. See, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(Becker J., concurring) (noting the difficulty lower courts have had with the preemption 
test). 
 97. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Shaw v. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983); see also ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra 
note 76, at 122. 
 98. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139-40 (1990) (holding 
that ERISA preempted wrongful discharge state law when the reason for termination 
discharge was to avoid contributing to the pension fund). 
 99. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004). 
 100. See ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 76, at 123. 
 101. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 649 (1995). 
 102. Id. at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); 
see also ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 76, at 132. 
 103. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 514 U.S. at 657-58. 
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4. Constriction of ERISA Safeguards Ultimately Undermines Employer 
Accountability 
The narrowing of civil enforcement and ERISA preemption 
mutually weakens employer accountability of ERISA violations, despite 
the existence of employer fiduciary duties.104 The lack of civil remedies 
such as punitive and consequential damages touched upon earlier105 is 
exacerbated when assessed in conjunction with ERISA preemption.106 
Even if a state law cause of action somehow survives Section 514’s 
explicit preemption and it permits consequential or punitive damages, 
Section 502(a) would also preempt it.107 The Supreme Court maintains 
that allowing participants and beneficiaries to obtain supplemental 
additional remedies under state law would undermine the intention to 
“creat[e] a comprehensive statute for the regulation of employee benefit 
plans.”108 However, barring monetary compensation for consequential 
damages (on both federal and state levels) has removed a plaintiff’s 
financial incentive to pursue legitimate claims until attaining a 
settlement or judgment.109  In turn, the financial burden emplaced on 
plaintiffs culminates in an overall under-enforcement, which eliminates 
pressure upon fiduciaries and employers to remain accountable.110 
In light of the Supreme Court’s deference to the administrative 
decisions of ERISA fiduciaries,111 stronger remedies allowing recovery 
may incentivize fiduciaries to not engage in violations.112 Furthermore, 
the intent to fashion ERISA as the sole remedy also extends preemption 
to bar wrongful retaliatory termination state claims if an underlying 
																																																																																																																																
 104. 29 U.S.C. § 1104. 
 105. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 106. 29 U.S.C. § 1144. 
 107. See Stris, supra note 5, at 395. 
 108. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004). 
 109. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care 
Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1055, 1068 (1996) (noting potential litigants “find it too expensive or too difficult 
to pursue their objections through the costly and time-consuming judicial process”). 
 110. See Stris, supra note 5, at 395. 
 111. See John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident 
Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
1315, 1321 (2007). 
 112. Sharon Tennyson & William J. Warfel, The Law and Economics of First-Party 
Insurance: Bad Faith Liability, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 203, 240 (2008). 
2014] REINSTATING EMPLOYER ACCOUNTABILITY  219 
           BY PROTECTING ALL FORMS OF WHISTLEBLOWING 
ERISA relation exists. 113  In light of these limiting factors, it is 
particularly important to determine which reading of Section 510, 
narrow or broad, would hold employer fiduciaries accountable.114 
C. THE ANTI-RETALIATION WHISTLEBLOWING ERISA PROVISION: 
SECTION 510 
1. Section 510: ERISA Anti-Retaliation Provision 
In its creation of ERISA, Congress found it necessary to create a 
framework of adequate safeguards relating to the establishment, 
operation and administration of employee benefit plans to ensure an 
unobstructed flow of information between participants and 
beneficiaries. 115  As part of the ERISA system, Congress included 
“various safeguards to preclude abuse and ‘to completely secure the 
rights and expectations brought into being by this landmark reform 
legislation.’”116 The precise safeguard that is the predominant concern of 
this Note is the anti-retaliation whistleblower protection provision—
Section 510. 
Section 510’s anti-retaliation provisions directly correlate to 
ERISA’s goal of setting a fiduciary duty standard.117 Section 510 seeks 
to protect employees and plan beneficiaries who report an alleged 
fiduciary duty violation. 118  An employee or beneficiary who “gives 
information or has testified or [is] about to testify in any inquiry or 
proceeding relating to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act” is 
protected from any resulting employer retaliation.119 Under Section 510, 
it is unlawful for any person to retaliate against a participant or 
beneficiary for exercising such protected rights granted under the 
																																																																																																																																
 113. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142-43 (1990). 
 114. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 115. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). 
 116. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 137 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 36 (1973), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4872). 
 117. 29 U.S.C. § 1140; see supra Part I.B.1. 
 118. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (“It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, 
suspend, expel or discriminate against any person because he has given information or 
has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter or 
the Welfare and pensions Plans Disclosure Act.”). 
 119. Id. 
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employee benefit plan, under ERISA or the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act. 120  This includes protection from a broad range of 
retaliatory actions such as: discharging, fining, suspending, expelling or 
discriminating.121 Section 510 is uniquely distinct from other statutes 
about arbitrary and retaliatory discharge 122  because it expands 
protections to a larger group of people: ERISA beneficiaries and 
fiduciaries.123 Congress specifically enacted this provision in order to 
prevent “unscrupulous employers from discharging or harassing their 
employees in order to keep them from obtaining vested pension 
benefits.”124 
2. Whistleblowing Laws 
Whistleblowing provisions specifically serve protective 
purposes. 125  A “whistleblower” is a person who seeks to correct or 
change current practices by disclosing information about the current 
practice. 126  The broad purpose of whistleblower provisions is to 
eliminate the fear of retaliation for voicing concerns or grievances.127 
Facilitating such admissions encourages transparency, disclosure and is 
considered to be vital to a “democratic, free enterprise system.”128 As is 
the case with Section 510, statutes that protect whistleblowers are not 
required to specifically use the term “whistleblower.129 This protection 
																																																																																																																																
 120. Id. (“It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel or 
discriminate against . . . “). 
 121. Id. 
 122. E.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (2013) 
(prohibiting discharges based on sex, race, color, religion or national origin); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2013) (prohibiting 
discharges based on age); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) 
(2013) (prohibiting discharges based on union organizing activity). 
 123. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 124. Gavalik v. Cont’l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting West v. 
Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980)). 
 125. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). 
 126. MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 15 (Arthur P. 
Brief et al. eds., 1992). 
 127. See Robert De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. at 292. 
 128. DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF 
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 22 (2d ed. 2004). 
 129. See id. 
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of whistleblowers is naturally inferred from the anti-retaliation 
provisions.130 
A statute’s anti-retaliation provision “seeks to secure [a substantive 
right] by preventing an employer from interfering (by retaliation) with 
an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s 
basic guarantees.” 131  Thus, anti-retaliation provisions are generally 
understood to be “laws protecting whistleblowers . . . meant to 
encourage employees to report illegal practices without fear of reprisal 
by their employers.”132 Because such statutes generally employ broad 
language to cover a variety of whistleblowing activities “when the 
meaning of the statute is unclear from its texts, courts tend to construe it 
broadly, in favor of protecting the whistleblower.”133 This interpretation 
construction is often the best way to avoid illogical results that counter 
“effectuate[ing] the underlying purposes of the law” and to ultimately 
hold employers accountable.134 
Whistleblowing is comprised of two reporting act categories: 
internal and external.135 The distinction between these two categories 
lies at the heart of the Circuit courts’ fractured and conflicting 
interpretation of Section 510’s protection.136 Internal whistleblowing is 
when employees report or submit objections of alleged violations within 
the organization. 137  External whistleblowing is when an employee 
reports or submits objections to alleged violations outside the 
organization to a governing agency, entity, officer etc.138 Section 510 
protects all external complaints (solicited and unsolicited) and internal 
solicited complaints. 139  However, there is an interpretive dissention 
																																																																																																																																
 130. See id. 
 131. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). 
 132. Haley v. Retsinas, 138 F.3d 1245, 1250 (8th Cir. 1998); accord Hill v. Mr. 
Money Fin. Co., 309 F. App’x 950, 961 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 133. Haley, 138 F.3d at 1250; accord Mr. Money Fin. Co., 309 F. App’x at 961. 
 134. Haley, 138 F.3d at 1250; accord Mr. Money Fin. Co., 309 F. App’x at 961. 
 135. Terry M. Dworkin & Melissa S. Baucus, Internal vs. External Whistleblower: 
A Comparison of Whistleblowing Processes, 17 J. BUS. & ETHICS 1281, 1281 (1998). 
 136. See infra Part II for an in depth discussion. 
 137. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 128, at 23. 
 138. See id. 
 139. The term “solicited” refers to instances when a whistleblower is requested, 
encouraged, or investigated to disclose a violation and is prompted into whistleblowing 
by another entity. 
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about whether Section 510 protects unsolicited internal complaints.140 
The purpose of this Note pertains to the fragmenting issue of whether 
unsolicited internal complaints should be protected under ERISA 
Section 510. 
3. Language of Section 510 
Interpreting Section 510 necessarily begins with construing the 
statute’s language.141 Section 510 of the ERISA provides, in relevant 
part, that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, 
or discriminate against any person because he has given information 
or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding 
relating to this chapter or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure 
Act.142 
Section 510’s anti-retaliation whistleblowing protection requires 
that: (1) the employee participated in a statutorily protected activity (2) 
an adverse employment action was taken against the employee and (3) a 
causal connection exists between the first two elements. 143  For the 
purposes of this Note, the key interpretive objective is to understand the 
scope of what constitutes statutorily protected conduct and whether 
unsolicited internal complaints falls within this category. 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: ARE UNSOLICITED INTERNAL COMPLAINTS 
PROTECTED?  
Part II of this Note will address the interpretive conflict among 
seven federal circuit courts regarding whether unsolicited internal 
																																																																																																																																
 140. The Fourth, Second and Third Circuits have held that Section 510 does not 
protect unsolicited internal complaints. See infra Part II.C for an in depth discussion. 
 141. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (7th ed. 1984). 
 142. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 143. Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir.1992) (to 
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff “must prove that he participated in a 
statutorily protected activity . . . that an adverse employment action was taken against 
him . . . and that a causal connection existed between the two.”) (emphasis added). 
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complaints are protected from retaliation under Section 510.144 Section 
510 is universally understood to protect whistleblowing employees 
when giving information or testifying in court about violations to 
external entities such as the Department of Labor.145 However, the focus 
of dissension is whether employees who voluntarily notify supervisors 
or employers of ERISA violations within the company are protected 
under Section 510. 146  Specifically, circuits are split about whether 
unsolicited internal complaints fall within the ambit of Section 510’s 
“inquiry or proceeding.”147 Part II will discuss the revival of this split 
with the Sixth Circuit’s recent affirmation of Section 510’s protection, 
and the urgent need for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.148 Next, 
this part will discuss the seminal Section 510 interpretative cases in the 
Ninth, Fifth and Seventh circuits and their holding that unsolicited 
internal complaints are protected.149 Lastly, this part will address the 
seminal cases and contrasting interpretation of Section 510 by the 
Fourth, Second, Third and Sixth Circuits, which denies unsolicited 
internal complaints any whistleblower protection.150 
 
																																																																																																																																
 144. Circuits Split over Whether ERISA Section 510 Applies to Retaliation Claims, 
ERISA AND LIFE INSURANCE NEWS (Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP), Dec. 2012, at 1-
4, http://smithmoorelaw.com/files/ERISA-December-2012-web-r.pdf. 
 145. See, e.g., Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 
2010) (noting that had Defendant provided the complaint to an outside body they would 
have been protected by Section 510); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 
(4th Cir. 2003) (articulating that an unsolicited external complaint would be protected). 
 146. See King, 337 F.3d at 427 (holding unsolicited internal complaints are not 
afforded Section 510 whistleblower protection); cf. Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 
F.2d 408, 408 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding unsolicited internal complaints are afforded 
Section 510 whistleblower protection). 
 147. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 148. See generally SCOTT L. NELSON, GETTING YOUR FOOT IN THE DOOR: THE 
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI (PUB. CITIZEN LITIG. GRP.), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/GettingYourFootintheDoor.pdf (outlining the 
requirements and considerations for petitioning for certiorari from the Supreme Court). 
 149. George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1312 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of 
Haw., 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 150. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014); A.H. Cornell, 
610 F.3d at 223, Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328-29 (2d Cir. 2005); 
King, 337 F.3d at 427. 
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A. FURTHER FRACTURING OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REQUIRES SUPREME 
COURT’S ATTENTION 
The appeal of Sexton v. Panel Processing granted the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals a first-time opportunity to assert a position in the 
unresolved circuit split about whether unsolicited internal ERISA 
complaints are afforded protection.151 Their affirmation of the Eastern 
District Court of Michigan’s denial of whistleblower protection has 
further widened the gap between the circuits, resulting in tattered 
protection across the states.152 Thus, it is increasingly imperative that the 
Supreme Court grant certiorari to resolve this split amongst seven 
circuits. 153  In doing so, the Supreme Court is likely to refer to and 
address each circuit’s decision and rationale in order to glean an 
interpretation that remains consistent with the intent and purpose of both 
of ERISA broadly and Section 510 specifically.154 
B. SECTION 510 BROADLY PROTECTS UNSOLICITED INTERNAL 
COMPLAINTS 
1. Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to expressly adopt a pro-
plaintiff interpretation of Section 510 in Hashimoto v. Bank of 
Hawaii.155 
Plaintiff Jessica Hashimoto alleged she was discharged from the 
Bank of Hawaii in retaliation for reporting ERISA violations to 
supervisors. 156  Hashimoto specifically objected to her supervisor’s 
inappropriate direction to reimburse former employees from a profit-
sharing plan that had been properly withheld from a lump sum 
distribution of his account.157 She also alleged that another supervisor 
																																																																																																																																
 151. Sexton v. Panel Processing Inc., 912 F. Supp. 2d 457, 459 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 152. See Sexton, 754 F.3d at 332. 
 153. See NELSON, supra note 148. 
 154. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 
(2011) (discussing circuit cases, definitions, state statutes and legislative history to 
assess Fair Labor Standard Act’s anti-retaliation statute). 
 155. Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 408 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 156. Id. at 409. 
 157. Id. at 410. 
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instructed her to violate ERISA regulations by recalculating a former 
employee’s pension plan benefit using the final pay, and not the final 
average pay. 158  Hashimoto contended that her unsolicited internal 
objections to the alleged ERISA regulatory and fiduciary duty violations 
and subsequent termination brought her within the realm of Section 
510’s whistleblower protection.159 
The Ninth Circuit expressly disagreed with the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment for wrongful discharge in favor of Bank of 
Hawaii.160 Bank of Hawaii had removed the case to district court, which 
then granted summary judgment to the bank upon determining that 
ERISA preempted Hashimoto’s state law claim.161 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Section 502(a) granted Hashimoto the 
opportunity to bring a cause of action for relief. 162  Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit determined ERISA completely preempted state law because the 
case could be addressed as a federal action.163 The Court subsequently 
remanded for trial on the basis that Hashimoto’s unsolicited internal 
complaint should be characterized as an ERISA claim under Section 
510.164 
The Ninth Circuit reached the decision to extend Section 510 
protection to unsolicited internal complaints by analyzing the anti-
retaliation provision’s language. 165  The court reasoned that because 
Section 510 provides protection to any individual who gives 
“information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or 
proceeding” related to ERISA, Congress intended to protect 
whistleblowers.166 The Ninth Circuit also noted that Section 510 was 
created as a safeguard to provide a remedy for an employee or plan 
beneficiary that is terminated solely because they supplied vital ERISA 
related information.167 Thus, the court acknowledged that because the 
statute was created specifically to protect whistleblowers, it is 
																																																																																																																																
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 412. 
 161. Id. at 410. 
 162. Id. at 411. 
 163. Id. at 412; see supra Part I.B.3. 
 164. See Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 409. 
 165. Id. at 411. 
 166. Id. 
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reasonable to construe Section 510 to protect unsolicited internal 
complaints such as Hashimoto’s.168 
The court addressed the scope of Section 510’s protection of an 
“inquiry or proceeding” by analyzing the process an employee would 
undergo to submit a whistleblower complaint.169 The court reasoned that 
the first step in giving information or testifying about a problem is to 
present the issue in a complaint to those responsible for the ERISA plans 
within the company, rather than directly proceeding to an outside 
governing agency. 170  However, if an individual’s employment is 
terminated for raising this issue, the process of giving information or 
testifying is immediately halted.171  The court reasoned that narrowly 
construing Section 510 would allow employers to escape the 
consequences of retaliation by encouraging the immediate dismissal of 
employees to halt the whistleblowing process.172 Such an “anticipatory 
discharge discourages the whistle blower before the whistle is blown.”173 
Although the court did not address whether Section 510 protects all 
employees discharged for submitting ERISA related complaints to 
employers, the Ninth Circuit clearly endorsed a broad construction of 
Section 510 upon determining that the provision was clearly meant to 
protect whistleblowers.174 
2. Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit was the second circuit to determine unsolicited 
internal complaints were protected under Section 510 in Anderson v. 
Electronic Data Systems Corp.175 
Plaintiff George Anderson claimed he had a Section 510 retaliatory 
termination claim against his former employer Electronic Data Systems 
Corporation, because the company allegedly terminated him for refusing 
to engage in ERISA violating actions and subsequently reporting such 
																																																																																																																																
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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 174. See id. 
 175. Anderson v. Elec. Data Systems Corp., 11 F.3d 1312, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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actions internally.176 Anderson alleges that in violation of ERISA, he 
was asked on two separate occasions to sign approval or payment 
invoices on pension portfolios without the approval of the pension 
trustees.177 Additionally, Anderson was also requested to write minutes 
for Electronic Data Services’ Retirement Plan meetings he did not 
attend, in violation of ERISA.178 Anderson refused to participate in any 
of these requests and reported all such incidents to management.179 He 
alleged he was demoted and discharged in retaliation for his refusal to 
comply with the illegal requests and accordingly is protected under 
Section 510.180 
Rather than engage in statutory interpretation like other circuits, the 
Fifth Circuit immediately and expressly accepted unsolicited internal 
complaints to fall within Section 510’s protection.181 The Fifth Circuit 
focused primarily upon whether the federal courts had subject matter 
jurisdiction and if ERISA preempted state law claims. 182  As in 
Hashimoto, defendant Electronic Data Systems also removed the case to 
federal court, which led to summary judgment in favor of Electronic 
Data Systems on the state wrongful discharge claim. 183  Anderson 
subsequently appealed. 184  Anderson argued that because the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the wrongful discharge claim 
should be remanded back to state court.185 In fact, in order to keep the 
case in state court, Anderson had purposely removed all mention of 
ERISA.186 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether ERISA preemption 
applied when a federal cause of action is not asserted.187 The court began 
this analysis by deliberating if Anderson’s state law claims were 
																																																																																																																																
 176. Id. at 1312. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 1313. 
 180. Id. at 1312-13. 
 181. Id. at 1313-15. 
 182. Id. at 1314-15. 
 183. Id. at 1313; Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 412 (9th Cir. 1993); see 
supra Part I.B.3 (discussing preemption). 
 184. Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1313. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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preempted by ERISA.188 The court referenced the Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon189 decision in which the Supreme Court held that ERISA 
preempted state wrongful discharge claims because the claim depended 
on the presence of an ERISA plan.190 The wrongful discharge claim 
conflicted with the ERISA Section 502 enforcement provision and fell 
“squarely within the ambit” of Section 510.191 Therefore, the claim was 
preempted. 192  The court determined that because Anderson’s claim 
relied on his refusal to commit ERISA violations and he alleged being 
terminated in retaliation for reporting ERISA violations, the claim 
required the “existence” of an ERISA plan.193 Thus, ERISA preempted 
the wrongful discharge state claim.194 
In order to determine whether the court had subject matter 
jurisdiction the court again looked to Supreme Court’s rationale, this 
time in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor.195 Here, the Supreme 
Court articulated that ERISA preempts a cause of action that can be 
categorized under Section 502, which consequently enforces Section 
510, and thus is removable to federal courts. 196  Therefore, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that the federal court had appropriate subject matter 
jurisdiction because Anderson’s claim falls within the ambit of Section 
510’s prohibition of discharging employees for providing ERISA related 
information or testimony.197 
3. Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit, in George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. 
Ind., Inc.,198 is the most recent circuit to determine Section 510 protected 
unsolicited internal complaints. 
																																																																																																																																
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 133 (1990)). 
 190. See Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140. 
 191. Id. at 142. 
 192. See id. at 144. 
 193. Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314; see Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140. 
 194. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314. 
 195. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (quoting Metro. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1987)). 
 196. Id. at 52. 
 197. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315. 
 198. See George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812, 817 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
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Plaintiff Victor George alleged wrongful termination for internally 
raising attention to discrepancies of his ERISA plan. 199  As Vice 
President of the Junior Achievement of Central Indiana, Inc., George 
discovered money withheld from his salary was not being deposited into 
either his retirement account or his health savings account.200 He then 
lodged complaints with the corporation’s accountants and executives, 
including the President and Chief Executive Officer.201 Although he did 
share his concern with the United States Department of Labor, he 
declined to file a written complaint. 202  Soon after expressing his 
objections to members of the Junior Achievement’s board, George 
received checks to make up for the missed deposit, including interest.203 
In early January 2010, Junior Achievement noticed George had drawn 
the account containing his deferred compensation.204 Considering this to 
be premature, Junior Achievement sent a termination letter stating 
George was discharged effective December 31, 2009 and required that 
he immediately restore the withdrawn sums to the deferred 
compensation account. 205  George responded by informing Junior 
Achievement the amendment to his employee agreement noted 
December 1, 2009 as the vesting date for his differed-compensation 
account.206  Regardless, Junior Achievement did not rescind George’s 
termination. 207  George alleged he was terminated in retaliation for 
initially raising objections about the discrepancy in his ERISA related 
account and, therefore, he was protected by Section 510.208 
The Seventh Circuit addressed this issue with an additional, 
influential tool unavailable to any of the prior decisions: the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp. 209  The Kasten decision suggested that when dealing with 
																																																																																																																																
 199. Id. at 813-14. 
 200. Id. at 813. 
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 203. Id. (noting Plaintiff received roughly $2,600). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 813-14. 
 209. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331 
(2011). 
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ambiguous anti-retaliation provisions, courts should resolve the 
ambiguity in favor of protecting employees if it is in accordance with 
the statute’s purpose.210 Although the Seventh Circuit did not discuss 
preemption, it launched into a detailed approach to the statutory 
interpretation of Section 510.211 
The Seventh Circuit approached the issue by noting that the point 
of disagreement is whether a Section 510 “inquiry” occurred.212 The 
Seventh Circuit engaged in its understanding of “inquiry” by parsing the 
phrase to imply that Section 510 covers both informal and formal 
approaches.213 The Court stressed that because the understanding of the 
phrase can be construed both ways, the language is ambiguous.214 The 
court recognized that dictionaries often contain both formal and 
informal definitions of “inquiry” but the added Supreme Court decision 
in Kasten encourages adopting an understanding that would primarily 
protect employees and be consistent with the statutory context. 215 
Ultimately, the court rejected adding modifiers such as “formal” or 
“solicited” to the understanding of “inquiry” in Section 510 because the 
text must be enforced as it is enacted, without any additions.216 
The court also focused on the multiple definitions of “inquiry.”217 
Despite the resulting awkward parallel construction, certain definitions 
(if imported) would be applicable to covering the full range of formal 
and informal inquiries.218 The court provided the example of inquiry 
being “[t]he action of asking or questioning” which would provide a 
better, albeit awkward prose than purely limiting Section 510 to formal 
proceedings and solicited inquiries.219 
Furthermore, the court rebuffed the argument that if “inquiry” is 
analogous with “question” then protection is applied only to questions 
																																																																																																																																
 210. Id. at 1333-34; Crawford v. Metro. of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 278-79 (2009). 
Kasten is discussed in depth in Part III.D.2. 
 211. George, 694 F.3d at 813. 
 212. Id. at 815. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. See also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 
1325, 1330 (2011). 
 217. George, 694 F.3d at 815. 
 218. See id. 
 219. Id. (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1010 (2d ed. 1989)). 
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asked of employees but not by employees.220 The court contended that 
no linguistic reason exists for why “inquiry” cannot refer to both 
employee and employer questions.221 The court reasoned that to hold 
otherwise would illogically treat Section 510 to protectively cover only 
half the dialogue between employer and employee. 222  The court 
articulated that because Section 510 refers to inquire broadly, without 
specification of who is initiating the inquiry, it therefore covers 
employee inquiries. 223  The Seventh Circuit further focused on the 
preposition “in” in the Section 510 phrase “in any inquiry or 
proceeding.” 224  The court conceded that to interpret “inquiry” as 
“question” would make its replacement in the phrase grammatically 
incorrect.225 However, the court stressed that the phrase is concerned 
with the setting of the information, but not just where the information is 
given, rather how the information is given.226 
The Seventh Circuit also determined that a complaint is the first 
step in an inquiry.227 The court found this argument to be particularly 
persuasive because although a complaint standing alone is not “civil 
litigation” it is the first step in a formal litigation process that would 
make a more formal “inquiry” inevitable.228 Thus, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that regardless of whether or not the employee’s complaints 
are solicited, Section 510 protects them. 229  Therefore, conversations 
George engaged in regarding the potential breach of ERISA fiduciary 
duties constituted an “inquiry” and required the district court’s judgment 
against George be vacated.230 
																																																																																																																																
 220. Id. (rejecting the Third Circuit’s approach in Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, 
Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
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 222. See id. 
 223. See id. 
 224. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (emphasis added). 
 225. George, 694 F.3d at 815. 
 226. See id. 
 227. Id. at 816-17. 
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C. SECTION 510 DOES NOT PROTECT UNSOLICITED INTERNAL 
COMPLAINTS 
Although the interpretations put forth by the Second, Third, Fourth 
and Sixth Circuits do not protect unsolicited internal complaints, each 
circuit implements varying interpretational approaches to reach that 
supposition.231 
1. Fourth Circuit: Only Formal Complaints Are Protected 
The Fourth Circuit determined that Section 510 only protects 
“formal” complaints in King v. Marriott International, Inc.232 
Plaintiff Karen King alleged retaliatory discharge after objecting to 
her employer’s alleged ERISA violations. 233  As an employee in 
Marriott’s benefits department, around late 1998 to early 1999, King 
was concerned over the appropriateness of the recommendation from 
Compensation and Benefits Senior Vice President Frederick that 
Marriott transfer millions of dollars into its general corporate reserve 
account from its medical plan. 234  King expressed her reservations 
regarding the propriety of such a transfer to coworkers and directly to 
Fredericks.235 In late 1999, after Fredericks promoted her, King once 
again learned and consequently objected to the revival of the plan to 
transfer funds in violation of ERISA.236 King took several actions to 
express her opposition, including protesting to Fredericks, expressing 
her concerns about the transfer’s legal implications with two in-house 
attorneys and obtaining an opinion letter from a Marriott in-house 
attorney.237 In September 1999, the benefits department was restructured 
and King was again promoted to Vice President of Benefits 
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Resources.238 In early 2000 when another transfer of funds from the 
medical plan was proposed, King again objected verbally and in writing 
to Fredericks. 239  She was terminated soon thereafter. 240  King then 
brought a claim alleging Marriot International, Inc. illegally retaliated 
by terminating her for her lodged objections to the fund transfer.241 
As most other plaintiffs, King originally filed an action under 
Maryland public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine by 
claiming that the discharge violated Maryland’s public policy. 242 
Marriott, like the other circuit’s defendants, 243  removed the case to 
federal court arguing ERISA preempted the state wrongful discharge 
claim.244 The district court denied King’s motion to remand and granted 
summary judgment in Marriott’s favor.245 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
deliberated whether Section 510 preempted King’s state law wrongful 
discharge complaint.246 Interestingly, unlike other circuits, the Fourth 
Circuit held that because Section 510 did not cover King’s internal, thus 
informal, complaint—her state law claim did not fall within the 
boundaries of a federal ERISA claim. 247  Thus, after engaging in a 
statutory interpretation of Section 510’s protection, the court remanded 
the case to state court for further proceedings.248 
The Fourth Circuit focused on the Section 510 language to 
determine that only “formal” complaints were protected.249 The court 
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reasoned that “instituted” connotes “a formality that does not attend an 
employee’s oral complaint to his supervisor.”250 In addition, the phrase 
“given information” protected the provision of non-testimonial 
information such as documents or evidence during an inquiry or 
proceeding.251 The Fourth Circuit examined the factual basis of King’s 
complaint and determined that King’s actions did not bring her within 
the ambit of Section 510.252 The complaint lacked any information that 
alleged King had testified in any legal or administrative proceeding or 
provided information for such a proceeding under the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation. 253  Although King filed internal complaints with co-
workers, supervisors and Marriott attorneys, the Fourth Circuit 
determined ERISA does not provide a federal cause of action for such 
unsolicited internal complaints.254 
The court further justified the conclusion that Section 510 only 
protected “formal” complaints by comparing the Section 510 phrase 
“inquiry or proceeding” in relation with other statutes.255 In an earlier 
interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) similar 
provision, the Fourth Circuit determined the definition of “proceeding” 
referred only to administrative or legal proceedings, but not to informal 
internal complaints.256 Thus, the Court ruled that Congress intended the 
FLSA to only protect employees who engage and testify in “formal” 
proceedings.257 The Fourth Circuit justified this result by stating that 
Section 510’s anti-retaliation provision is much narrower than 
counterpart provisions in Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, it 
consequentially requires a “much more circumscribed remedy.”258 
The Fourth Circuit recognized its narrow interpretation of a 
formalistic requirement varied from Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ Section 
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510 determinations.259 The Fourth Circuit criticized the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach for merely reciting Section 510 without addressing the facial 
inapplicability to internal complaints or engaging in any statutory 
interpretation.260  It also argued that the Ninth Circuit’s protection of 
unsolicited internal complaints was rooted fundamentally in the public 
policy of protecting whistleblowers, despite recognizing that Section 
510 may be inapplicable to internal complaints.261 Ultimately, the Fourth 
Circuit rejected the notion of yielding results specifically aligned with 
public policy when Section 510’s language can be compellingly 
interpreted to deny protection to informal unsolicited internal 
complaints.262 
2. Second Circuit: Cautious Approach Requiring Relation to “Inquiry or 
Proceeding” 
The Second Circuit is the only circuit straddling the middle ground 
between entirely rejecting protection to all unsolicited internal 
complaints and affording them complete protection. 263  The court 
cautiously addressed the parameters of Section 510’s protection in 
Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc.264 
Plaintiff Chrystina Nicolaou alleged being terminated after finding, 
investigating and internally reporting ERISA violations at Horizon 
Media, Inc.265  As Director of Human Resources and Administration, 
Nicolaou was both a participant in Horizon Media’s 401(k) employee 
benefit plans regulated by ERISA and a fiduciary trustee due to her 
occupational position.266 Nicolaou allegedly discovered a decade-long 
persisting payroll discrepancy that severely underfunded Horizon Media 
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Inc.’s 401(k) plan.267 Nicolaou divulged the matter once to Horizon’s 
Chief Financial Officer, who told her to drop the issue, and twice to 
Horizon’s controller who neglected to address or rectify the issue.268 
Upon recognizing that no remedial action was being taken, Nicolaou 
consulted Mark Silverman, a Horizon attorney, who undertook his own 
investigation into the matter and ultimately confirmed the ongoing 
underfunding.269 Nicolaou then met with the President of Horizon to 
discuss the persistent underfunding.270  Soon thereafter, Nicolaou was 
demoted to Office Manager and two replacements were hired to assume 
Nicolaou’s former duties as Director of Human Resources and 
Administration. 271  She was ultimately terminated from Horizon and 
consequently brought a Section 510 claim asserting her demotion and 
termination for lodging ERISA violations was wrongful retaliation.272 
Similar to the Fourth Circuit’s approach, the Second Circuit 
focused its interpretation on contrasting Section 510 with other anti-
retaliation provisions.273 In reviewing the district court’s dismissal, the 
Second Circuit determined that its previous ruling in Lambert v. 
Genesee Hospital 274  was not controlling or decisive. 275  The Second 
Circuit contrasted Section 510’s language with its whistleblowing 
counterparts in the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 276  The Second Circuit held that Section 
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15(a)(3) of Fair Labor Standards Act does not apply to retaliation 
resulting from unsolicited internal complaints, but rather, was limited to 
instances when an employee lodged a formal complaint or cooperated 
with a regulatory agency’s investigation.277  Upon determining that it 
could “find no distinction” between FLSA’s whistleblower provision 
and ERISA Section 510 the district court dismissed Nicolaou’s claim 
because Lambert limited protection to external or solicited 
complaints.278 
The Second Circuit found that FLSA, when contrasted with ERISA 
Section 510, lacked any plain language that encompassed unsolicited 
internal complaints made to a supervisor.279 Unlike the Fourth Circuit,280 
the Second Circuit justified this distinction upon Section 510’s 
“unambiguously broader” language than the language of FLSA’s 
whistleblowing provision.281 The whistleblowing provision of the FLSA 
extends retaliation protection to any person who “has filed any 
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under 
or related to” the FLSA. 282  In comparison, ERISA Section 510 is 
applicable to “any inquiry or proceeding relating to ERISA.”283 
The Second Circuit next compared the connotations of 
“proceeding” and “inquiry.”284 The court concluded that regardless of 
the formal undertones of “proceeding” which may refer to the 
progression of a lawsuit or any other action related to a court, agency or 
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other official body, “inquiry” refers broadly to any request for or 
gathering of information.285 
Although the Second Circuit, did not address the broader question 
of whether Section 510 covers unsolicited complaints, 286  the court 
cautiously distinguished the Nicolaou decision from King, in which the 
Fourth Circuit applied clear limits on Section 510. 287  Rather than 
undertake the Fourth Circuit’s approach of focusing on the formality or 
informality of the circumstances, the Second Circuit relied on whether 
the circumstance surrounding the provision of information constitutes an 
ongoing “inquiry.” 288  Thus, the Second Circuit applied a restrained 
approach to the interpretation of Section 510 and distinguished King for 
failing to interpret “inquiry” distinctly from proceeding.289 The Second 
Circuit also recognized that applying narrow reasoning, limits an ERISA 
fiduciary to four options: “(1) do nothing and face possible co-fiduciary 
liability under ERISA Section 405; (2) make [their] own inquiries 
among [their] superiors and face a retaliatory response; (3) bring the 
matter to the attention of a regulatory agency and hope that doing so is 
not discovered by [their] superiors, at least until the agency begins its 
own inquiry; or (4) take upon [their self] the burden, and the uncertain 
prospects, of filing a suit under the provision of ERISA which allows 
fiduciaries to seek ‘to enjoin any act or practice that violates’ the 
statute.” 290 
Nicolaou’s holding is limited to the finding that if Nicolaou could 
demonstrate that counsel arranged the meeting between Nicolaou and 
Horizon Media’s CEO, the meeting would fall “within the definition of 
an ‘inquiry’” and therefore be protected by Section 510.291 The Second 
																																																																																																																																
 285. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329. 
 286. Id. at 332 (Pooler, J. concurring) (stating that, despite Nicolaou’s unclear 
scope, an “inquiry” within Section 510’s parameters occurred when she began 
conducting her own inquiry into the alleged payroll violation and “not merely from the 
point at which [she and outside counsel met with Horizon Media’s officials]”). 
 287. Id. at 329 (citing King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 
2003)). 
 288. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330; King, 337 F.3d at 427 (determining that the usage of 
“inquiry or proceeding” regards only “the legal or administrative, or at least . . . 
something more formal than written or oral complaints made to a supervisor”). 
 289. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330. 
 290. Id. at 331 (Pooler, J., concurring). 
 291. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330. 
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Circuit is the only circuit to take a middle ground approach that refrains 
from embracing a decisive rejection or acceptance of whether 
unsolicited internal complaints are protected.292 
3. Third Circuit: Unsolicited Complaints are Not Protected 
The Third Circuit also held that unsolicited internal complaints are 
outside of Section 510 protection in Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, 
Inc.293 
Plaintiff Shirley Edwards contended that upon discovering alleged 
ERISA violations, she was wrongfully terminated from her position for 
raising objections. 294 Edwards, in her capacity as Director of Human 
Resources, alleged finding ERISA violations.295 She claimed to have 
discovered the corporation was engaging in many ERISA violations 
such as: administering group health plans in a discriminatory way, 
attempting to deter employees from opting into benefits by 
misrepresenting the cost of group health coverage, and providing false 
social security numbers and information to insurance carriers in an effort 
to enroll non-citizens in the corporation’s ERISA plans. 296  Edwards 
alleged that her employment was terminated for complaining about the 
described violations to A.H. Cornell’s management. 297  Edwards 
contended she fell within Section 510’s ambit and had a claim against 
her employer for wrongfully retaliatory termination resulting from 
lodging ERISA-related complaints.298 
The Third Circuit built its decision about Section 510’s protection 
by analyzing the plain language meaning of “inquiry.”299 Finding that 
Edwards had duly “given information” by objecting to management 
about the alleged violations, the Third Circuit approached the scope of 
Section 510 by determining if the objection was part of any “inquiry or 
proceeding.” 300  The Third Circuit rejected Secretary of Labor’s 
																																																																																																																																
 292. Id. 
 293. 610 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 294. Id. at 218. 
 295. Id. at 218-19. 
 296. Id. at 219. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 218. 
 299. Id. at 222. 
 300. Id. 
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argument that “[b]roadly but naturally construed, ‘any inquiry or 
proceeding’ encompasses plan participants’ complaints to management 
or plan officials about wrongdoing, and the process by which that 
information is considered, however informal.” 301  Instead, the court 
referred to Black’s Law Dictionary definition of, “[a] request for 
information.”302 Because Edwards was not approached or requested to 
provide information regarding the ERISA violation, but rather 
voluntarily lodged a complaint on her own accord, the court rejected 
Edwards’ claims.303 
Furthermore, the court rejected Edwards’ argument that her 
objections and complaints were themselves an inquiry. 304  The court 
found that the complaints were mere statements, not questions seeking 
information. 305  Section 510 protects employees who have “given” 
information but not those who have “received,” so a plain reading would 
limit that inquiries be made of an employee, but not by an employee.306 
The court held that although the complaints could eventually have led to 
a protected inquiry, they had not developed to be protected by Section 
510 when Edwards was terminated.307 
The Third Circuit also interpreted “proceeding” in line with the 
Fourth and Second Circuit to constitute a formal, administrative 
progression and are thereby inapplicable to Edwards’ complaints.308 The 
ruling meant no inquiry or proceeding, under the terms’ plain meanings, 
occurred.309 The district court dismissed Edwards’ claim after finding, 
under the Second Circuit’s analysis in Nicolaou, Edwards’ complaints to 
																																																																																																																																
 301. Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Hilda L. Solis, as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 16, Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 
2010) (No. 09-3198). 
 302. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (9th ed. 
2009)). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. See id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 (9th ed. 2009)) (defining 
proceeding as “[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit” or the “procedural 
means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.”); see Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328-
29 (comparing the definition between Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary). 
 309. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223. 
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A.H. Cornell management did not constitute an “inquiry or 
proceeding.”310 
The Third Circuit also justified its decision that Section 510 of 
ERISA is distinguished from the similar anti-retaliation provisions in 
Section 704(a) of Title VII.311 Opposed to Section 510, Section 704(a) of 
Title VII employs broad language to extend expansive protection to 
employees that have “opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by [Title VII]”.312 Much like the Fourth Circuit, 
the Third Circuit found it persuasive that because Congress declined 
employing the same broad language in Section 510, the protections 
afforded must differ.313 Furthermore, the court found the Ninth and Fifth 
Circuit’s contrary decisions to be unpersuasive.314 
The Third Circuit also rejected the argument put forth by Edwards 
and the Secretary of Labor that Section 510 should be read broadly 
because it is a remedial statute.315 The court held that ERISA provisions 
should only be “liberally construed” if the statutory text was ambiguous 
but because Section 510 provided an “unambiguous” plain meaning, the 
statute should not be liberally construed. 316  Furthermore, the court 
reasoned that had Congress intended a broader reading that denial of 
unsolicited internal complaints would undermine the provision’s 
purpose, Congress would have used broad language.317 Thus, the Third 
Circuit held Edwards’ complaint did not fall within the ambit of Section 
510 because it does not protect unsolicited internal complaints.318 
Judge Cowen dissented from the court’s narrow construction of 
Section 510’s protection for multiple reasons and instead argued that 
																																																																																																																																
 310. Id. at 219; see generally Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (declining to extend Section 510 protection to unsolicited internal 
complaints). 
 311. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223; 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(2012). 
 312. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (2012)). 
 313. Id.; see King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 314. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223. The Third Circuit noted that the Fifth Circuit 
only “gave the issue cursory treatment” and the Ninth Circuit concentrated not on the 
statutory language but rather what would constitute a “‘fair’ interpretation.” 
 315. Id.; Brief for Appellant at *9-10, A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d. 217 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(No. 09-3198), 2009 WL 6870703. 
 316. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223. 
 317. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 224. 
 318. Id. at 218. 
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ERISA protected unsolicited internal complaints.319 Judge Cowen’s first 
point of disagreement is the majority’s classification of the statutory 
language as unambiguous. 320  Instead, Judge Cowen classifies the 
statutory language as ambiguous because it is extremely unlikely 
Congress intended ERISA’s anti-retaliation provision to deny protection 
to a category of whistleblowing conduct.321 
The second fault Judge Cowen uncovers in the Third Circuit 
majority’s decision is the disregard shown to the role Section 510 plays 
in safeguarding ERISA.322 Congress included Section 510 as a safeguard 
in order to deter violations and “to completely secure the rights and 
expectations brought into being by this landmark reform legislation.”323 
Congress viewed this anti-retaliation provision as an essential facet in 
the implementation of the ERISA scheme because it “helps to make 
[ERISA’s] promises credible.”324 Judge Cowen puts forth that Congress 
clearly viewed this anti-retaliation to be a crucial statutory safeguard of 
ERISA “because, without it, employers would be able to circumvent the 
provision of promised benefits.”325 
Most importantly, Judge Cowen criticizes the court’s unsustainable 
interpretation because it leaves the field of ERISA protection in absolute 
disarray.326 He criticizes that in defining “inquiry,” the court adopts the 
Fourth and Second Circuit’s narrow interpretation, when in reality, 
providing employees protection only after an initiated internal 
investigation is “unworkable in certain circumstances.”327 He illustrates 
that the interpretation put forth only protects employees when they are 
asked a follow up question by a supervisor after lodging an ERISA 
complaint.328 He reasons that under this interpretation the employee is 
																																																																																																																																
 319. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 226-27 (Cowen, J., dissenting). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 226 (Cowen, J., dissenting). 
 323. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (quoting S.Rep. 
No. 93-127 at 36 (1973)). 
 324. Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
520 U.S. 510, 515 (1997). 
 325. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 143 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-127 at 35-36; 
H.R.Rep. No. 93-533 at 17 (1973)). 
 326. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 227 (Cowen, J., dissenting). 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 228. 
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not wholly protected and a supervisor is wrongly incentivized to 
immediately retaliate against the employee rather than conduct an 
investigation or raise questions regarding the matter.329 
4. Sixth Circuit: Only Information in Inquiries are Protected 
In 2012, the Eastern District Court of Michigan denied Section 510 
protection to Plaintiff Brian Sexton for his unsolicited internal 
complaint, an email informing his employer of Sexton’s intention to 
report ERISA violations to both state and federal employees.330 Sexton 
alleged his email complaint resulted in the subsequent termination of his 
position at Panel Processing.331 
The district court’s rationale hinged on Section 510’s language of 
“inquiry or proceeding” and the determination that the threatening email 
lacked any connection to either an inquiry or proceeding.332 The court 
narrowly construed “inquiry” to mean “the act or an instance of asking 
for information.”333 The Eastern District Court of Michigan concluded 
that when information regarding ERISA is not requested or solicited by 
any person, there exists no “inquiry.”334  The court also decided that 
Sexton’s ERISA related email did not constitute a proceeding because 
“proceeding” means “the course of procedure in a judicial action or in a 
suit in litigation.”335 Because Sexton had not given information in an 
inquiry or proceeding, the Eastern District Court of Michigan held 
Sexton’s unsolicited internal complaint outside of Section 510’s 
protection.336 The court justified this restrictive construction of Section 
																																																																																																																																
 329. Id. 
 330. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 331. Id. at 459. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Sexton, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 459; WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 1167 (unabridged ed. 2002). BLACK’S also defines “inquiry” as “[a] 
request for information.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (8th ed. 2004). 
 334. Sexton, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
 335. Id. Analogously, BLACK’S defines “proceeding” as the “regular and orderly 
progression of a lawsuit,” the “business conducted by a court or other official body” or 
“[a]ny procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.” See Nicolaou, 
402 F.3d at 328-29 (comparing the definition between Black’s Law Dictionary and 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary). 
 336. Sexton, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 475. Although Sexton had not taken his complaints 
to the U.S. Department of Labor, he had spoken with several lawyers after sending the 
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510’s language on the belief that because Congress chose this particular 
language, to extend the meaning beyond the language would counter the 
congressional intent of the statute.337 
The Sixth Circuit has affirmed the Eastern District Court of 
Michigan’s decision regarding the range of Section 510.338 The Sixth 
Circuit put forth an interpretation on this issue within this past year after 
hearing oral arguments from both parties. 339  Although the court 
recognized that Sexton was not attempting to claim the email amounted 
to testimony in an inquiry or proceeding, the court was particularly 
focused on whether the email constituted “giv[ing] information . . . in an 
inquiry.” 340  While the court conceded that the email was giving 
information, they held that it was not for an inquiry, or an official 
investigation.341 
The Sixth Circuit, in its decision, placed an emphasis on dissecting 
the clauses of other whistleblower claims.342 Essentially, whistleblower 
protection laws fall into two categories: 1) clauses to protect those who 
provide information in an inquiry and 2) those that protect people who 
oppose unlawful practices.343 The court surmised that because Congress 
had only included the first type category in Section 510, Congress 
intended to exclude protecting people who oppose, report, or complain 
about unlawful practices.344 The courts perspective was that “[w]here 
words differ as they differ here, Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”345 
																																																																																																																																
email about lawsuit options). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (providing whistleblower 
protection to a person who “has given information or has testified or is about to testify 
in any inquiry or proceeding”). 
 337. Sexton, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60. 
 338. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 339. Brief of Defendants – Appellees Panel Processing, Inc. at 10, Sexton v. Panel 
Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (2014) No. 13-1604, 2013 WL 4401115 at *10; Brief of 
Plaintiff – Appellant Brian Sexton at 3, Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 
(2014) No. 13-1604, 2013 WL 3795752 at *3. 
 340. 29 U.S.C. §1140 (2012); Sexton, 754 F.3d at 334. 
 341. See Sexton, 754 F.3d at 335. 
 342. Id. at 335. 
 343. See id. at 335. 
 344. See id. at 336. 
 345. Id. at 336 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 
(2006)). 
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III. SECTION 510 SHOULD PROTECT UNSOLICITED INTERNAL 
COMPLAINTS 
Part III analyzes the issue of what lies in Section 510’s future. As 
mentioned, this year the Sixth Circuit put forth its own interpretation of 
Section 510’s protection in the appeal of Sexton. 346  Given the sheer 
magnitude of the split and the growing number of involved circuits, the 
grant of certiorari could ultimately resolve the split. 347  Should the 
Supreme Court grant certiorari, Part III focuses on persuasive arguments 
and tools that may be consulted or referred to in determining whether 
unsolicited internal complaints are protected. First, the Secretary of 
Labor has consistently advocated for a broad reading of Section 510.348 
Next, this Part addresses the basis of statutory construction that may be 
employed in interpreting Section 510’s protection. Then, Part III will 
recognize state remedies inadequacy of providing uniform remedies to 
employees across the nation. Part III also explains that although state 
whistleblowing laws have the capacity to broadly encompass unsolicited 
internal complaints, not all states have enacted such comprehensive 
whistleblowing laws. Additionally, a comparison to broad state and 
federal whistleblowing laws will depict a national trend of increasing 
whistleblower protective coverage. Lastly, Part III focuses on the 
adverse obstacle proponents of a broad Section 510 whistleblower 
coverage face if the Supreme Court utilizes textualism. 
																																																																																																																																
 346. See Sexton, 754 F.3d 332; see supra II.A. for discussion. 
 347. NELSON, supra note 148, at 3; see, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 
Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1330 (2011) (Supreme Court granting certiorari to 
resolve circuit split of FLSA’s anti-retaliation statute). 
 348. See Part III.A; see, e.g., Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Appellant for Reversal at 5, Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 
(No. 03-9186) (advocating a broad interpretation of Section 510 to include unsolicited 
internal complaints); Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Hilda L. Solis, as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., 
Inc., 694 F.3d 812 (No. 11-3291) (advocating a broad interpretation of Section 510 to 
include unsolicited internal complaints). 
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A. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
The Secretary of the Department of Labor has remained active in 
these cases by submitting Pro-Plaintiff amicus curiae briefs. 349  If a 
petition of certiorari is successful and the Supreme Court addresses the 
circuit split regarding Section 510, the Secretary’s position may be of 
some relevance.350 
The Secretary of the Department of Labor has submitted several 
briefs as part of its advocacy for a broad construction of Section 510.351 
The Supreme Court Justices have previously questioned the propriety of 
providing Chevron deference to such amicus curiae briefs.352 The Court 
left the question unanswered and thus lower courts are only required to 
apply Chevron deference when an agency has the authority to issue 
regulations or enforce the rules in administrative proceedings.353 
The Secretary’s power is limited to that of a prosecutor, namely 
bringing suits and asking for judicial enforcement. 354  Prosecutors, 
however, are not delegated any rulemaking or adjudicative authority in 
regards to Section 510.355 “[B]ecause Congress has expressly established 
																																																																																																																																
 349. See Part III.A; see, e.g., Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Appellant for Reversal at 6-7, Nicolaou, 402 F.3d 325 (No. 03-9186) 
(encouraging the reversal of the lower court’s narrow interpretation of Section 510); 
Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Hilda L. Solis, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff 
at 11, George, 694 F.3d 812 (No. 11-3291) (endorsing a broad interpretation of Section 
510). 
 350. E.g. NELSON, supra note 148, at 14 (discussing the petitioning process for 
Supreme Court certiorari). 
 351. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant 
for Reversal, Nicolaou, 402 F.3d 325 (No. 03-9186); Brief of the Secretary of Labor as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, George, 694 F.3d 812 (No. 11-3291). 
 352. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2165-69 
(2012) (discussing whether amicus curiae briefs require Chevron deference); see also 
Chevron, USA Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 846 (1984) 
(holding courts must defer to the statute interpretation made by government agencies 
responsible for enforcing them, unless the interpretation is unreasonable). 
 353. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (“We have long recognized that considerable 
weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory 
scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative 
interpretations.”). 
 354. See ERISA Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/ 
erisa_enforcement.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2014). 
 355. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5)-(e)(1). 
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the Judiciary and not the Department of Labor as the adjudicator of . . . 
rights of action arising under the statute,” Chevron deference does not 
apply.356 Thus, despite submitting amicus curiae briefs, the court has not 
always accepted the Department of Labor’s position. 357  Therefore, 
although the Secretary’s arguments may receive respectful 
consideration, the law does not require courts to “defer” to the 
Department’s position.358 
In the context of Section 510’s language, the Secretary clarifies 
that, unlike the words “testify” and “proceeding,” terms such as 
“information” and “inquiry” have an extremely broad scope, 
encompassing both internal and external complaints.359 Additionally, the 
Secretary specifically notes the Seventh Circuit’s broad approach in 
George appropriately recognized that “inquiry” is modified by the all-
encompassing term “any.” 360  Section 510 prefaces the mention of 
information given in “any inquiry” making it evident that Congress 
intended to cover “all kinds of investigation- whether formal or 
informal, internal or external.”361 The Secretary of the Department of 
Labor also criticized the Fourth Circuit’s King rationale because it failed 
to address what distinguishes “inquiry” and “proceeding.” 362 
Furthermore, the King court did not adequately consider the 
differentiation of scope between “given information” and “testify.”363 
																																																																																																																																
 356. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990). 
 357. See, e.g., Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellant for Reversal at 12, Nicolaou, 402 F.3d 325 (No. 03-9186) (providing 
reasoning for adopting a broad interpretation for Section 510 that the court did not 
adopt). 
 358. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). 
 359. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant 
for Reversal at 6-7, Nicolaou, 402 F.3d 325 (No. 03-9186). 
 360. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Hilda L. Solis, as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, George, 694 F.3d 812 (No. 11-3291); see also 
Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 126 (2002) (quoting United 
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)) (explaining that “‘the word ‘any’ has an 
expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind’“). 
 361. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant 
for Reversal at 7, Nicolaou, 402 F.3d 325 (No. 03-9186). 
 362. See Brief for Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellant at 17-18, George, 694 F.3d 812 (No. 11-3291). 
 363. Id. at 17-18. 
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Most importantly, the Secretary of the Department of Labor argues 
that the recommendation for a broad interpretation is aligned with the 
purpose of ERISA and the Supreme Court’s policy. 364  Specifically, 
because ERISA is a remedial statute, “inquiry” should be broadly 
construed to protect unsolicited internal complaints since “[ERISA] 
should be liberally construed in favor of protecting the participants in 
employee benefit plans.”365 
B. PRINCIPLES OF SECTION 510’S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
The potential analysis of ERISA’s anti-retaliation provision by the 
Supreme Court will begin with an examination of Section 510’s 
statutory language. 
Although legislative intent is not dispositive, the Supreme Court 
will likely consider the legislative intent of both Section 510 and 
ERISA. There is a presumption that “legislation reflects the will of the 
people, and a clearly expressed ‘legislative intent’ is consistent with the 
public’s reasonable expectations.”366 As previously discussed,367 ERISA 
was envisioned as a means of protecting pensions from tampering, 
mishandling or misuse.368 Additionally, whistleblowing anti-retaliation 
statutes are generally a means of employer accountability to “secure [a 
substantive right] by preventing an employer from interfering (through 
retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement 
of the [Act].” 369  In light of fiduciary duties, preemption, and civil 
																																																																																																																																
 364. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1334-
35 (holding that the anti-retaliation provision should be resolved in light of what is fair 
to employees); Crawford v. Metro. of Nashville, 255 U.S. 271, 278-79 (supporting the 
same proposition). 
 365. See IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 
127 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 366. 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45:6 (7th ed.) 
 367. See supra Part I.A. 
 368. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 
1974 1 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005) (“ERISA was Congress’ attempt to devise a 
comprehensive regulatory program to protect millions of American workers who 
looked to private pension plans for financial support in their retirement years”). 
 369. Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). 
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remedies, 370  it is clear that Congress designed Section 510 as an 
additional safeguard to hold employers accountable.371 
Additionally, the Supreme Court is likely to presume that Congress 
intends the statutory text to be read in accordance with its plain 
meaning, and that none of the enacted language is superfluous.372 Thus, 
Congress’s inclusion of both terms “inquiry” and “proceeding,” rather 
than the single term “proceeding” included in the Fair Labor Standards 
Act Section 15(a)(3), indicates the intention “to give the nouns their 
separate, normal meanings” and go beyond the protection afforded by 
the FLSA.373 That, in conjunction with the broad range of prohibited 
retaliatory actions 374 and the broad coverage of people,375 indicates the 
Congressional intent for ERISA to be construed broadly. 
C. INADEQUACY OF STATE LAW REMEDIES 
As discussed in Part I.B, the Supreme Court may take into account 
the amount of protection state laws afford whistleblowers when 
addressing what Section 510 protects. 376  If ERISA does not protect 
internal complaints, federal courts will dismiss an internal complaint for 
a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.377 Instead, 
employees will have to bring retaliation claims under state law, subject 
to a particular state’s laws.378 However, due to ERISA preemption, such 
state claims are likely to be preempted from providing individuals 
																																																																																																																																
 370. See supra Part I.B. 
 371. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 372. BedRoc Ltd. v. United Sates, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 
534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). 
 373. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73 (1984). 
 374. 29 U.S.C. §1140 (protecting against retaliatory actions such as discharging, 
fining, suspending, expelling or discriminating). 
 375. Id. (extending coverage to fiduciaries and beneficiaries). 
 376. State Whistleblower Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-whistleblower-laws.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2014). 
 377. See, e.g., Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir. 
2010) (dismissing for failure to state a claim after holding that unsolicited internal 
complaints do not fall within ERISA). 
 378. See, e.g., King v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(remanding after finding that claim was preempted by ERISA but that the employee’s 
state law wrongful discharge claim was not entirely preempted). 
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appropriate relief. 379  As demonstrated in King, because state 
whistleblowing statutes generally only protect external violation 
allegations, if Section 510 is read narrowly, employees will be 
unprotected for bringing forth unsolicited internal complaints.380 
Most importantly, reserving remedies to the states is an inadequate 
solution due to the lack of conformity among state laws.381 Because 
comprehensive whistleblower laws remain absent in many states,382 the 
lack of broad ERISA Section 510 federal protection results in uneven 
whistleblower protection from state to state. 383  Ultimately, this 
undermines the Congressional intent to protect benefit plans and 
structure ERISA as a comprehensive, uniform act.384 
Thus, if applied broadly, Section 510 has greater potential to 
protect employees who suffer from employer retaliation than under state 
laws.385 Furthermore, if an employee is in a circuit that broadens ERISA 
protection to unsolicited internal complaints, 386  the only remaining 
burden is to prove a causal connection exists between the lodged 
																																																																																																																																
 379. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 380. See King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 866 A.2d 895, 906 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) 
(rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that her termination violated public policy and thus fell 
within the Maryland’s at-will employment doctrine’s public policy exception). 
 381. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 at (A)(3)(c)(ii) (2012) (West) 
(protecting disclosures when the employee has reasonable belief of a violation) ; N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(a)(1) (West 2006) (protecting employees who disclose or threaten 
to disclose a violation of law); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(b) (West 2013) 
(protecting employees who report a violation or suspected violation orally or in 
writing); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(b) (West 2014) (protecting employees who disclose 
or may disclosed information). 
 382. See State Whistleblower Statutes, NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER, 
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=742&I
temid=161 (last visited Jan. 4, 2014). 
 383. See Trystan Phifer O’Leary, Note, Silencing the Whistleblower: The Gap 
Between Federal and State Retaliatory Discharge Laws, 85 IOWA L. REV. 663, 689 
(2000). 
 384. See supra Part I.A. 
 385. See NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER, supra note 382 (depicting the lack 
of general state whistleblower protection, and observing that only 17 of the 50 states 
provide a statutory cause of action protecting private sector whistleblowers from 
retaliatory discharge). 
 386. See supra Part II.B.1-3 (The Ninth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits protect 
unsolicited internal complaints). 
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complaint and subsequent termination.387 Upon making a prima facie 
retaliation case, courts are deferential to the employee in considering 
whether to dismiss, even if the employer presents an appropriate, non-
discriminatory reason for discharging. 388  It seems that Section 510 
would provide far more expansive protection to whistleblowing 
employees than standard state law anti-retaliation claims.389 
D. WHISTLEBLOWING PROTECTION COMPARISON: STATE AND FEDERAL 
It is important to note, however, that despite the existence of broad 
whistleblowing coverage in certain states, reserving remedies for states 
alone would lead to inadequate, parsed whistleblower protection from 
state to state.390 
1. Comparing State Whistleblowing Laws 
Unfortunately, most states have piece-meal whistleblower 
protections, which curtail whistleblower protection specifically to 
certain sectors of employment (usually public).391 However, some states 
have adopted comprehensive Whistleblower Protection Acts for public 
and private employees including: Arizona, 392  California, 393 
Connecticut,394  Delaware,395Florida,396  Hawaii,397  Illinois,398  Indiana,399 
																																																																																																																																
 387. Simons v. Midwest Tel. Sales and Serv., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1007-08 
(D. Minn. 2006) (citing Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir. 
1992)) (noting that claims brought under Section 510 undergo a three-step burden 
shifting framework analysis in which the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case 
of retaliation by proving: (1) they participated in a statutorily protected activity; (2) an 
adverse employment action was taking against them; and (3) a casual connection 
existed between the two). 
 388. See, e.g., Dunn v. Elco Enters., Inc., No. 05-71801, 2006 WL 1195867, at *9 
(E.D. Mich. May 4, 2006) (instructing courts to exercise caution in dismissing once the 
employee has established a prima facie case). 
 389. See NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER, supra note 382. 
 390. See supra Part III.B. 
 391. See NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER, supra note 382. 
 392. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (1995) (West). 
 393. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 2012). 
 394. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 2005). 
 395. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 1703 (West 2013). 
 396. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102. (West 2013). 
 397. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 174/15 (West 2002). 
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Maine,400 New Hampshire,401 New Jersey,402 North Dakota,403 Ohio,404 
Rhode Island,405 and Tennessee.406 
In understanding the breadth of these states’ whistleblowing 
protections, we identify and categorize four categories.407 These four 
categories of protected whistleblowing conduct under state law are: (1) 
Reporting to a public authority (2) Reporting to an in-progress 
investigation or proceeding (3) Reporting complaints in-house and (4) 
Objecting or refusing to participate.408 In terms of the circuit dispute 
over protection afforded by Section 510,409 we are particularly interested 
in category (3) Reporting complaints in house, as all the cases brought 
before the Circuit Court of Appeals fall within this conduct category.410 
Many states’ whistleblowing provisions explicitly protect 
unsolicited internal complaints made to a supervisor.411 In Arizona, the 
law protects disclosures when employees disclose “either [to] the 
employer or a representative of the employer who the employee 
reasonably believes is in a managerial or supervisory position and has 
the authority to investigate the information provided by the employee . . 
. .” 412  In Connecticut, whistleblowing protection is afforded when 
information “is provided to or the investigation is conducted by . . . a 
																																																																																																																																
 398. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 174/15 (West 2002). 
 399. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-11-5.5-8 (West 2012). 
 400. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 833 (2015). 
 401. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (2009). 
 402. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2002). 
 403. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34-01-20 (2010). 
 404. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (West 2011). 
 405. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-50-3 (WEST 2008). 
 406. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (West 2011). 
 407. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 376 
(showing varying state whistleblowing statutes that can be arranged into four broad 
categories). 
 408. Id. 
 409. See supra Part II. 
 410. Sexton v. Panel Processing, 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014); George v. Junior 
Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2012); Edwards v. A.H. Cornell 
& Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010); King v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 337 F.3d 421(4th 
Cir. 2003); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005); Anderson v. 
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 
F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 411. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra 376. 
 412. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 at 3(c)(ii) (1995) (West) (emphasis added). 
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person with supervisory authority over the employee, or such other 
person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, 
discover or terminate misconduct . . . .”413 In Delaware, employees are 
protected if the retaliation occurs “[b]ecause the employee reports 
verbally or in writing to the employer or the employee’s supervisor a 
violation, which the employee knows or reasonably believes has 
occurred or is about to occur unless the employee knows or has reason 
to know that the report is false” (emphasis added). 414  Hawaii’s 
whistleblowing state laws affords protection if “the employee, or a 
person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report to 
the employer . . .” an alleged violation (emphasis added).415 Maine also 
protects disclosures made to superiors if “[t]he employee, acting in good 
faith, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports orally or in 
writing to the employer or a public body” what the employee reasonably 
believes is a violation of a law or rule (emphasis added).416 New Jersey 
state whistleblowing laws protect employees who “[disclose] or 
[threaten] to disclose to a supervisor or a public body an activity, policy 
or practice” that violates the law (emphasis added).417  North Dakota 
broadly affords whistleblower protection to an “employee, or a person 
acting on behalf of an employee, [who] . . . reports a violation or 
suspected violation of federal, state, or local law, ordinance, regulation, 
or rule to an employer, a governmental body, or a law enforcement 
official”.418 In Ohio, employees who reasonably believe a violation has 
occurred are protected from whistleblowing retaliation if “the employee 
orally [notifies] the employee’s supervisor or other responsible officer 
of the employee’s employer” (emphasis added).419 Additionally Rhode 
Island whistleblowers are protected from retaliatory actions taken 
“[b]ecause the employee reports [a violation] verbally or in writing to 
the employer or to the employee’s supervisor” (emphasis added). 420 
Although most comprehensive state whistleblowing laws frame the 
protection with varying vocabulary and sentence structures, many offer 
																																																																																																																																
 413. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1336 (a) (West 2005). 
 414. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1703(4) (West 2013). 
 415. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-62 (West 2008). 
 416. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(1)(A) (2005). 
 417. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(a) (West 2002). 
 418. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34-01-20 (1)(a) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 419. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52(A)(1)(a) (West 2011). 
 420. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-53-3(4) (West 2008) 
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employees protection if they are retaliated against for disclosing a 
violation to employers or superiors via an internal and unsolicited 
complaint.421 
The growing trend to extend broad whistleblower coverage is 
evident in the additional safeguards state laws have created to protect 
whistleblowing employees. 422  As mentioned earlier, the existence of 
category (4) Objecting or refusing to participate purposely remains 
silent on how or to whom the employee objects in order to work as a 
catch-all category. Indiana whistleblowing employees are protected if 
they have “objected to an act or omission.”423 In New Hampshire, the 
law prohibits retaliation measures if an employee “objects to or refuses 
to participate in any activity that the employee, in good faith, believes is 
a violation of the law.”424 Additionally, New Jersey whistleblowing laws 
protect an employee that “objects to, or refuses to participate in any 
activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonable believes” is a 
violation of law.425 
The lack of whistleblowing uniformity is also evident among states 
that possess extensive coverage because each state employs unique 
means of protecting employee disclosures. 426  For example, Hawaii’s 
extensive whistleblowing state laws protect not just the disclosure 
employees make, but also if an employee was “about to” make a 
disclosure.427 Thus, the statute uniquely protects those employees who 
are retaliated against before they even get an opportunity to make such a 
disclosure. 428  Other states, like Florida, distinctively encourage and 
promote internal-organization solutions by requiring employees to 
disclose to employers in order to provide employers an opportunity to 
																																																																																																																																
 421. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 376 
 422. Id. 
 423. IND. CODE ANN. §5-11-5.5-8 (a)(1) (West 2012). 
 424. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2(I)(b) (2009). 
 425. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(c) (West 2002). 
 426. See generally HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-62(2) (West 2002) (providing 
whistleblower protection even before making a complaint); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
448.102(1) (West 1991) (requiring disclosure to supervisor or employer before 
qualifying for whistleblower protection). NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, supra note 376. 
 427. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-62(2) (West 2008). 
 428. Id. 
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handle, address or rectify the complaint.429 Thus, the examination of 
broad whistleblowing state laws encourages a broad reading of Section 
510 for two distinct reasons: (1) it highlights the growing national trend 
to protect whistleblowers and (2) it underscores that if protection is left 
solely to the states, whistleblowers will be afforded various levels of 
protection depending exclusively upon the state where the action is 
brought. 
2. Comparison Federal Whistleblowing Laws: Fair Labor Standard Act 
In determining the breadth of Section 510’s protection, the circuits 
often refer to the Fair Labor Standard Act’s anti-retaliation statute430 as a 
comparative tool.431  Under the FLSA’s whistleblowing provision: “It 
shall be unlawful for any person . . . (3) to discharge or in any other 
manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has 
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any 
proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to 
testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an 
industry committee.”432 
In 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States considered 
whether the FLSA anti-retaliation provision protected oral as well a 
written complaints in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp.433 The Supreme Court engaged in a broad purposivist analysis of 
anti-retaliation and whistleblowing provisions in Kasten in a manner 
that is pertinent and analogous to how Section 510 protection should be 
determined.434 
Petitioner Kevin Kasten brought a retaliation claim under FLSA 
against his former employer Saint-Gorbain Performance Plastics 
																																																																																																																																
 429. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102(1) (West 2013). 
 430. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012). 
 431. See generally Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 221-30 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (discussing the FLSA in the context of whistleblower protection); Nicolaou 
v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 327-29 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing FLSA as a 
comparative tool); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427-28 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(focusing on the language of FLSA). 
 432. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012). 
 433. 131 S. Ct. at 1330. 
 434. Id. at 1331-36. 
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Corporation.435 Kasten alleged that Saint-Gorbain purposely located its 
time clocks between where employees removed their work-related gear 
and where they worked in order to prevent paying employees for the 
time spent putting and taking off their protective work gear.436 Because 
this was a clear violation of the FLSA, Kasten brought the time clock’s 
location to Saint-Gobain’s attention in accordance with the 
organization’s internal grievance-resolution procedure.437 Kasten alleges 
he orally discussed that the location of the time clocks could be legally 
challenged as a violation to his shift supervisor, the human resources 
employee, the operations manager and the lead operator at Saint-
Gobain.438 Due to the conflict among the Circuits regarding whether oral 
complaints are protected under the FLSA, the Supreme Court granted 
Kasten’s petition certiorari.439 
The Kasten court held that, under the FLSA, retaliation against an 
employee who “has filed any complaint” includes oral statements 
because “filed” sometimes refers to oral statements. 440  The Court, 
however, reached this conclusion only after analyzing a variety of 
sources.441 The Court looked to other anti-retaliation provision statutes 
despite their use of different language.442 
First, it noted that some dictionary definitions of “filed” 
contemplate the medium of writing. 443  However, other dictionary 
																																																																																																																																
 435. Id. at 1329. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. at 1330. 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. Compare Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 625-36 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (anti-retaliation provision covers oral complaints), and Lambert v. Ackerley, 
180 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (same), with Lambert v. Genesee 
Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1993), abrogated by Kasten, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (anti-
retaliation provision does not cover complaints to supervisors). See also Pacheco v. 
Whiting Farms, Inc., 365 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2004) (anti-retaliation provision 
covers unofficial assertion of rights); E.E.O.C. v. White & Son Enterprises, 881 F.2d 
1006, 1011-12 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562-63 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (assuming without discussion that oral complaints are covered); Brennan v. 
Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975) (same). 
 440. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1329. 
 441. Id. at 1331-36. 
 442. Id. at 1332-33 (citing various anti-retaliation statutes). 
 443. Id. at 1331 (discussing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY’s 
definition of “file”). 
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meanings extend the definition to include oral material such as being 
included “into the order of business.”444 This is significant because the 
Court found the phrase “filed a complaint” was not limited to written 
complaints but broadened to encompass oral complaints.445 
Moreover, although the language is broader than the phrase “filed 
any complaint,” the phrase itself linguistically applies to the broader 
oral-inclusive interpretation.446 The Court surmised that the use of this 
broader language elsewhere may indicate that Congress (1) wanted to 
limit the scope of the phrase to writing only, or (2) did not consider a 
different phraseology made a significant difference in the mediums of 
oral or writing.447 
Additionally, the Court focused on the general usage of the term 
“file” by legislators, administrators, and judges. 448  The Court 
acknowledged that state statutes often consider oral filings. 449 
Regulations promulgated by federal agencies sometimes permit 
complaints to be filed orally.450 Additionally, judges use the term “filed” 
to contemporaneously include written and oral mediums.451 Thus, the 
Supreme Court considered the function and objective of the Act to 
determine the meaning of the FLSA phrase “filed any complaint.”452 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the FLSA phrase protecting 
employees who have “filed any complaint” acknowledged that the 
provision in isolation may be open to competing interpretations. 453 
However, the Court determined that only one interpretation is 
permissible when considering the purpose and context of the 
provision.454  The Court noted that the Act sought to prohibit “labor 
																																																																																																																																
 444. Id. (discussing FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE’s definition of “file”). 
 445. Id. 
 446. Id. at 1333. 
 447. Id. 
 448. Id. at 1331. 
 449. See id. (citing various state statutes using the word “‘file’ in conjunction with 
oral statements”). 
 450. See id. at 1331-32 (citing examples of regulations permitting complaints to be 
filed orally). 
 451. See id. at 1332 (citing instances where courts acknowledged oral filings prior to 
the FLSA). 
 452. Id. at 1333-34. 
 453. Id. at 1330-31. 
 454. Id. 
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conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of 
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers.” 455  The anti-retaliation provision particularly makes the 
enforcement scheme effective by removing an employee’s “fear of 
economic retaliation” and allowing them to not “quietly . . . accept 
substandard conditions.” 456  The Court questioned whether Congress 
would want to limit the effectiveness of the Act by only protecting the 
complaints provided in writing, thus effectively marginalizing illiterate, 
less educated or overworked workers. 457  The Court especially 
recognized that Congress was influenced by President Roosevelt’s 
message that workers were in desperate need of an Act that could 
protect them.458 Thus, ultimately the Supreme Court’s decision suggests 
that when dealing with ambiguous anti-retaliation provisions, courts 
should strive to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the statute’s 
purpose.459 
The Court noted that limiting the anti-retaliation provision solely to 
written complaints would negate the Act’s flexibility, ultimately 
preventing its effectiveness.460 It would prevent the implementation of 
hotlines, interviews or any other oral means of receiving complaints.461 
The Court also recognized and was persuaded by decisions and 
arguments articulated by the Secretary of the Department of Labor.462 
This encouraged courts to broadly construe the interpretation of anti-
retaliation statutes to allow additional means by which an employee may 
																																																																																																																																
 455. Id. at 1333. 
 456. Id. at 1333 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 
292 (1960)). 
 457. Id. at 1333. 
 458. Id. (noting President Franklin Roosevelt had pointed out worker were in need 
of the Act’s help). 
 459. See id. at 1331 (“considering the provision in conjunction with the [statute’s] 
purpose and context leads us to conclude that only one interpretation is permissible”). 
 460. Id. at 1334. 
 461. Id.; see Fair Labor Standards Act, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF Labor, 
http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-flsa.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) 
(directing participants who wish to “file a complaint” to contact a local office “or call 
the Department’s Toll–Free Wage and Hour Help Line at 1–866–4–US–WAGE”). 
 462. See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1335 (“The Secretary of Labor has consistently held 
the view that the words ‘filed any complaint’ cover oral, as well as written, 
complaints.”). 
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submit violations in order to promote, not curtail, the legislation’s 
effectiveness.463 
The Court did concede to Saint-Gobain’s argument that the statute 
required fair notice.464 The Court, however, explained that it would be 
difficult for an employer, who is unaware an employee has made a 
complaint, to discriminate due to that complaint.465 Additionally, fair 
notice is not limited to writing.466 Furthermore, although the consulted 
sources (definitions, statutes, regulations, judicial opinions) grouped 
writing and oral statements, the term “filing” did indicate a serious 
occurrence.467 Thus, the court required that in order to fall under the ant-
retaliation provisions protection, a complaint must be clear and detailed 
regardless of what medium it is presented in.468 
E. OBSTACLE OF ACHIEVING A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 510: 
TEXTUALISM 
The circuit split regarding Section 510’s interpretation is likely to 
be resolved if the Supreme Court grants certiorari.469 Upon addressing 
the issue, some justices may find Justice Antonin Scalia, an avid 
proponent, legal theorist and practitioner of textualism, to be highly 
influential.470 
Textualism proposes that the text is the starting point for all 
statutory interpretation and that one must follow the statutory plain 
meaning if the text is clear.471 Textualists stress that legislative history 
should not be consulted, because the role of the judge is to be focused 
on applying the text of a statute, not deciphering the meaning and 
																																																																																																																																
 463. Id. at 1336 (“We conclude that the Seventh Circuit erred in determining that 
oral complaints cannot fall within the scope of the phrase “‘filed any complaint’ in the 
Act’s anti-retaliation provision.”). 
 464. Id. at 1334. 
 465. Id. 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. at 1333. 
 468. Id. 
 469. See generally id. at 1336 (resolving the circuit court split over FLSA’s anti-
retaliation clause by granting certiorari and holding oral complaints as protected). 
 470. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Book Review: The New Textualism and Normative 
Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (discussing the impact of Justice Scalia’s 
position as a textualist). 
 471. Id. 
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purpose of it. 472  This textualist approach arises out of wariness of 
judicial activism; if the words themselves don’t command the result, it is 
the legislature’s, not judiciary’s job to import that meaning.473 
Textualists, like Scalia, criticize the approach some judges apply in 
interpreting the meaning and parameters of a statute. 474  Although a 
broader expansionary interpretation may put into context the purpose of 
the provision and also harmonize the entire U.S. Code to solve a 
mischief, textualists fundamentally reject this approach. 475 Unless said 
explicitly, Justice Scalia and other textualist justices will not force intent 
within the text because textualism employs a narrow approach to 
Congressional intent. 476  Thus, textualists are fundamentally pitted 
against purposivists who focus their statutory interpretation on the 
purpose and intent of the enacted legislation.477 In his book Reading 
Law, Justice Scalia stresses the superiority of a textualist approach 
because otherwise judges will not refrain from reading their own values 
into the statutes whereas textualism places a rein on imputing personal 
judicial values.478 
Justice Scalia passionately advocated and implemented this exact 
textualist interpretative approach in his Kasten dissent.479 Justice Scalia 
argued that the Supreme Court should affirm the Seventh Circuit’s 
judgment for the employer on the grounds that Fair Labor Standards Act 
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §215(a)(3) covers only written complaints.480 He 
criticizes the majority’s examination of modern state and federal 
statutes, arguing that the only relevance of such provisions is that none 
of them achieves results by using the phrase “filed any complaint” in 
their language to include complaints, submitted to employers. 481 
																																																																																																																																
 472. Id. 
 473. Id. at 533. 
 474. Id. at 532. 
 475. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012). 
 476. See Eskridge, supra note 470, at 532. 
 477. Id. at 533. 
 478. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 475, at 16. 
 479. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1336 
(2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 480. Id. at 1336-67. 
 481. Id. at 1339. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (prohibiting retaliation against 
employees who “oppos[e] any [unlawful] practice”). 
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Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s dissent stresses that “[w]hile the 
jurisprudence of this Court has sometimes sanctioned a ‘living 
Constitution,’ it has never approved a living United States Code.”482 
Therefore, Justice Scalia reasons that Congress’s 1938 enactment must 
be applied based on the language of the text, not in accordance with 
what modern Congress (or this Court) would prefer.483 
This Note has addressed such as the purpose of whistleblowing 
provisions and the foundational intent surrounding ERISA’s 
enactment.484 Instead, textualists would simply refer to Section 510’s 
language to decipher if it has plain meaning.485 If plain in meaning, the 
text will be applied as is, if not then textualists will seek to use that 
particular language’s definitions and colloquialisms to decipher its 
meaning.486 
A textualist approach removes all legislative history and purpose 
when considering a provision’s correct interpretation.487 Justice Scalia 
stressed that, although the Secretary of Labor has the authority to issue 
regulations under the legislative provisions, they possess no authority in 
interpreting regulations or provisions.488 Justice Scalia would argue that 
providing any deference or consideration to the briefs submitted by the 
Secretary of the Department of Labor would be improper.489 
Thus, even though granting certiorari would fundamentally resolve 
the split among circuits as to if Section 510 protects unsolicited internal 
complaints, such an interpretation may fail if there are enough Justices 
willing to embrace the textualist approach. 490  Additionally, it is 
important to note that behind philosophical interpretations lurk policy 
preferences. 491 
																																																																																																																																
 482. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1339 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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 484. See supra Part III. 
 485. See Eskridge, supra note 470, at 532. 
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 487. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1339-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 488. Id. at 1340. 
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 490. Eskridge, supra note 470, at 532. 
 491. Michael A Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter? 
Unpacking Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 AMERICAN POLITICAL 
SCIENCE REVIEW No. 3 (Aug. 2008.), available at http://faculty.georgetown.edu/ 
baileyma/Bailey_Law_APSR2008.pdf (discussing the effect of personal policy 
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IV. SECTION 510 SHOULD PROTECT ALL WHISTLEBLOWING 
COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO SUBMIT UNSOLICITED 
INTERNAL COMPLAINTS 
Part IV of this Note extends Section 510’s future reach by 
proposing a judicial-based solution grounded in the inherent ambiguity 
and a legislative-based solution that would lead to a broader, protective 
reading. Then this part explores the adverse policy ramifications of 
limiting Section 510’s protection to not cover unsolicited internal 
complaints. This part concludes with the consideration of the various 
policy and social benefits Section 510 would provide if its protection 
were not limited by any requirement of formality or solicitation. 
A. JUDICIAL CONFLICT SOLUTION: AMBIGUITY 
The conflict among the seven circuits about whether unsolicited 
internal complaints are protected inherently reveals the ambiguity of 
Section 510. 492 The Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits endorse a broad 
reading of Section 510 to include unsolicited internal complaints under 
the federal anti-retaliation remedies available to whistleblowers.493 On 
the other hand, the Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuits have denied 
unsolicited internal complaints relief under ERISA, leaving employees 
to find remedies under state law. 494  Since Kasten does not provide 
decisive instruction, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in order 
to explicitly resolve the circuit split,495 and instruct that ambiguous anti-
retaliation statutes, like Section 510, must be resolved in favor of 
employees. 496  This will re-establish an equal level of protection for 
whistleblowing employees of all the United States circuits, regardless of 
what form or to whom they disclose alleged ERISA complaints.497 
																																																																																																																																
 492. See supra Part II.A. 
 493. See supra Part II.B for discussion of circuits that protect internal, unsolicited 
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 494. See supra Part II.C for discussion of circuits that deny protecting unsolicited 
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available under state law wrongful discharge causes of action. 
 495. See supra Part II.D. 
 496. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331 
(2011); Crawford v. Metro. of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 278-79 (2009). 
 497. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331 (2011); Crawford, 555 U.S. at 278-79. 
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B. LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT SOLUTION: ‘INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL’ AND 
‘SOLICITED OR UNSOLICITED’ 
Although the Supreme Court may resolve the conflict, Congress 
should also amend ERISA to provide unambiguous protection to all 
whistleblowers that submit alleged ERISA violations, regardless of how 
or to whom they complain. 498 Solving the conflict between internal and 
external could be simply accomplished by editing Section 510 to 
protect: 
Any person who gives solicited or unsolicited information internally 
or externally or is solicited or unsolicited to testify or about to testify 
in any internal or external inquiry or proceeding relating to ERISA. 
The addition of these phrases promptly clarifies that Section 510 
protects all complaints, whether internal or external and/or solicited or 
unsolicited. 499  It will also adhere to the rationale put forth by the 
Secretary of Labor and the Ninth Circuit, and recognize that a complaint 
lodged by an employee, even internally, is protected as the first step in 
an “inquiry or proceeding.”500 Such an interpretation is consistent with 
the purpose of Section 510, 501  protects the Department of Labor’s 
interests,502 aligns with Supreme Court’s recent FLSA whistleblowing 
decision in Kasten,503 avoids the unequal protection of whistleblowers 
via circuit jurisdictions or via state whistleblowing laws,504 and works in 
conjunction with the growing state and federal trend to protect 
whistleblowers505 in an effort in increase disclosure, transparency and 
accountability.506 
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C. ADVERSE RAMIFICATIONS OF APPLYING A NARROW INTERPRETATION 
If implemented, a narrow approach would yield significant and far-
reaching adverse ramifications. 507  Excluding unsolicited internal 
complaints will discourage employees from reporting employer’s 
ERISA violations, undermining the purpose of Section 510.508 Should 
employees decide to stay silent as a result, ERISA’s primary 
enforcement method would fail and ultimately obstruct Congress’s 
intention to ensure accountability. 509  Additionally, if the law limits 
participants and beneficiaries from using reporting mechanisms, the 
protective force of the whistleblowing provision will weaken. 510 
Moreover, this interpretation would encourage managers to simply fire 
whistleblowers before enough information could be solicited to initiate 
formal inquiry or proceeding.511 
Overall, the narrow interpretation would damage an organization’s 
communication and efficiency in solving existing problems internally, 
because whistleblowers would be forced to take the more drastic step 
and immediately go directly to the public or an external governing party 
to disclose alleged violations. 512  This contravenes established 
congressional goals because it would prevent an organization from 
conducting a cost-effective internal inquiry or resolution of the merits of 
a complaint.513 
																																																																																																																																
 507. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellant for Reversal at *10, Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3198), (explaining the widespread ramifications of adopting a 
narrow interpretation of Section 510). 
 508. Id. at *23. 
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D. SOCIETAL AND POLICY BENEFITS OF APPLYING A BROAD 
INTERPRETATION 
Even when setting aside the overwhelming support for a broad 
interpretation of Section 510, 514  extending Section 510 protection to 
unsolicited internal employee complaints provides many extrinsic 
benefits. 
A broad interpretation would encourage the key policy of 
encouraging internal complaints as they are often the most effective and 
direct way to bring forth an objection on an issue requiring attention.515 
Protecting and encouraging internal complaints would validate 
grievance procedures and provide supervisors an internal opportunity to 
remedy or address the validity of the objection before outside parties 
became involved.516 This allows Section 510 to stay true to its protective 
purpose,517 especially since the weakening of other ERISA provisions—
civil remedies 518  and preemption 519 —undermine remedies, 520  which 
mandate employer accountability to uphold their fiduciary duties. 521 
Additionally, a broader interpretation provides the flexibility to allow 
organizations to solve issues internally without the added pressures of 
negative publicity, legal costs, reputational harm, and drop in company 
stock price that accompanies external whistleblowing disclosures.522 
The arguments, which opponents of a broad Section 510 
interpretation put forth, as articulated by the Second, Third, Fourth and 
Sixth Circuit’s decisions, are far-reaching and unpersuasive. 523  Such 
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opponents argue the inclusion of unsolicited internal complaints would 
cause Section 510 to be evoked liberally. 524  Specifically, protecting 
unsolicited internal complaints would “tip the balance of ERISA” and 
jeopardize employer’s prerogative to make legitimate business judgment 
decisions.525 Additionally, proponents of a narrow interpretation argue 
that embracing a broad protection would essentially “create ‘tenure for 
all employees who deal with ERISA related issues, including 
bookkeepers, human resource personnel, in house counsel, and health 
insurance brokers, etc. and would harm the corporation’s ability to make 
legitimate business decisions.’” 526  However, these arguments are 
unconvincing and overreaching because employees who alleged Section 
510 retaliation claims must still prove a prima facie case of retaliation.527 
Even if courts broadly construe Section 510, plaintiffs must 
establish a prima facie case of retaliation or interference by showing 
“that (1) he participated in a protected activity . . . (2) he suffered an 
adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal connection 
between the two events.”528 Even when a plaintiff establishes a prima 
facia case for retaliation, if the employer articulates a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its action, the burden again shifts back to the 
plaintiff to prove that the proffered reason is not pretextual.529 Because 
the burden remains upon plaintiffs, Section 510 should be broadly 
interpreted to include unsolicited internal complaints. 
CONCLUSION 
As a key safeguard in holding employers accountable to their 
fiduciary duties, it is exceptionally important that Section 510 of ERISA 
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protect all individuals who allege any violations, regardless of the 
complaint’s form. To do so truly promotes the intention, purpose and 
protection of ERISA. Barring unsolicited internal, complaints, however, 
would alienate or harm vulnerable individuals who faithfully report 
alleged violations only to be retaliated against with no redress—all 
simply due to the form of their complaint. Moreover, the additional 
modes of communication and internal investigations advanced by 
broadening protection to internal, unsolicited internal complaints would 
quickly eliminate baseless complaints and allow corporations to solve 
unintentional oversights without external interference. In reference to 
the persisting circuit conflict, this Note offers both a judicial and 
congressional based solution to expand Section 510’s protective reach to 
unsolicited internal complaints. Either of these approaches will 
successfully broaden Section 510’s scope for all circuits and ultimately 
will safeguard employee benefits, promote disclosures, facilitate internal 
solutions and continue to keep employers accountable. 
 
